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Socio-political transformations in the Sahel region of West Africa over the last decade have revitalized the role of civil society in shaping political processes in the region, making it an increasingly pressing and contested issue in the search for democratic consolidation. Civil society emerges as both a battleground and a bridge between power and resistance to it. Yet, two dominant and contradictory narratives have gained prominence about its prospects. On the one hand, there is the narrative of a “shrinking civic space” as presented on democracy scorecards. This narrative frames civil society as the silenced victim of state repression suffocating under authoritarianism. On the other hand,this unfolds the narrative of a “liberatory” awakening defended by neo-pan-Africanist social media discourses. This narrative imagines civil society as a willing partner of state actors, including military transitional governments, working together to reclaim sovereignty in a new fragmented, multi-polar emerging world order. The coexistence of these two narratives is nothing new, but their divergence has now reached the point where representing either one in isolation borders on the absurd. Such representations could be overly simplistic, failing to account for the nuanced, often paradoxical realities of civil society’s engagement with power. It is contended in this paper that the interaction between repression and liberation obscures the dynamic and evolving nature of civil society, which is characterized by inherent tensions and ambiguities.

Facing the ongoing crisis in Niger, ECOWAS stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, ECOWAS initial threat of military intervention triggered a backlash from various quarters. Burkina Faso and Mali rallied to support the Niger junta, portending a regional split. On the other hand, a less coercive response might throw ECOWAS central role in maintaining peace, security, and democracy in West Africa in doubt. What explains ECOWAS actions in Niger? What can ECOWAS learn from this crisis?

This Briefing note recommends a multi-sectoral approach to ending the Boko Haram insurgency and recognises the several issues driving the insurgency.

Nigerians went to the polls for the third and final set of elections in 2023, with citizens in Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi electing state governors. These polls were conducted in the wake of contentious general elections that produced a new president, national legislators, and 28 state governors.

The Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi off-cycle elections are scheduled to take place on November 11, 2023. Off-cycle elections are held outside the general elections schedule due to circumstances such as death, resignation, impeachment, annulment of elections by courts, and many more. The forthcoming off-cycle elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi, which are scheduled to take place in the aftermath of the 2023 Nigerian general elections, hold a pivotal place in the country’s democratic process. These elections provide a unique opportunity for a swift evaluation of the new government’s performance so far and offer a referendum on how citizens in these states respond to the leadership of the recently elected administration. The outcomes of these contests will significantly impact the political fortunes of the parties involved and lay the foundation for the upcoming general elections in 2027. The 2023 Nigerian general elections marked an important milestone in the country’s democratic journey, characterized by technological advancements, increased civil society participation, and identity-based divisions among candidates and parties. These factors influenced the election results and set the stage for the off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi.

This policy brief outlines contributions from stakeholders and demonstrates how dialogue can help foster community understanding of government intervention on reintegration, foster citizenship ownership of government programmes and its many solutions, improve Operation Safe Corridor's credibility and assist the government in creating conditions that will reduce Nigeria's susceptibility to future violent extremism.

In Burkina Faso, community run security forces known as Koglweogo have been working at a local level to prevent and punish crime, from theft to armed attack.

This report provides a situational analysis of the aftermath of Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya's 2021 coup that ousted President Alpha Conde. The report explores the transition period, highlighting both promising developments and challenges. It discusses the initiation of an inclusive dialogue, institutional reforms, anti-corruption efforts, and development projects.

Briefly taking stock of the pertinent theoretical literature on democratic transitions, civil military relations, identity conflict, and the merit of focusing on the role of individual leaders, this study comparatively examines and evaluates their legacy on two of Mauritania's enduring challenges:

This journal comprises several articles. The first article on page 4 is titled: Biafran Separatist Agitations in Nigeria: Causes, trajectories, scenarios and the way forward by Prof. Jideofor Adibe discusses the causes of the civil war in the Republic of Biafra, Nigeria after the coup in July 1966 and the subsequent rise of the separatist movement.

For the first time in many electoral cycles, Nigerians were optimistic about the prospects of the 2023 general elections being credible. While there are various reasons behind this unusual optimism, the enactment of the Electoral Act 2022 stood out as a key factor. Its enactment increased the credibility ratings of the Independent National Electoral Commission(INEC) and the electoral process resulting in a record number of new voter registrations ahead of the elections. Arguably one of the most anticipated pieces of legislation in Nigeria's Fourth Republic, the Electoral Act 2022 was expected to enhance INEC's autonomy, both functionally and financially, and amplify the transparency of electoral proceedings. Yet, as the 2023 election cycle unfolded, it became clear that the Act wasn’t living up to these expectations and the broad-based optimism. Contrary to expectations, the Act's implementation did not translate to a higher voter turnout, seamless elections or a reduction in post-election litigation. Given this backdrop of high expectations juxtaposed against increased discontent, this paper delves into the Electoral Act 2022 and its influence on the 2023 elections.

The West Africa region has been impacted by violent conflict, often characterized by insurgencies, terrorism, intercommunal clashes, and criminal activities. Several factors contribute to the violent conflict in the Greater Sahel, including socio-economic challenges, political instability, weak governance, and competition over resources. The region faces numerous development challenges, such as poverty, high unemployment rates, limited access to education and healthcare, and food insecurity. These conditions, coupled with a lack of strong institutions and poor governance, create an environment conducive to conflict and exploitation by various armed groups. Jihadist and extremist groups have gained prominence in the Greater Sahel, aiming to establish Islamic states, implementing strict interpretations of Sharia law, and challenging state authority. Some of the prominent armed groups operating in the region include Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM), affiliated with al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). These groups have conducted attacks on military and civilian targets, committed human rights abuses, and engaged in smuggling, kidnapping for ransom, and other criminal activities. The violent conflicts in West Africa have had devastating consequences for the affected populations. This situation led to mass displacement, loss of lives, human rights violations, and hindered socio-economic development. The conflicts have also exacerbated existing intercommunal tensions, leading to cycles of revenge and further instability.

Mohammed Bazoum, the staunchly pro-Western president of Niger, fell victim to the latest coup d'état in West Africa. In the early morning of July 26, reports on social media from Niamey, the country's capital, hinted at a mutiny, but many inhabitants reassured others that there was no cause for concern. However, by midday, the rumors were confirmed, and President Bazoum found himself detained by his presidential guard, with General Omar Tchiani implicated as the instigator. General Tchiani has since July 28 assumed the leadership of the National Council for the Safeguard of the Homeland (CNSP in French), the new Niger military government.

This journal comprises several articles. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has to decide whether Morocco's application to join should be accepted or thrown out. Jibrin Ibrahim in his article 'Morocco and ECOWAS

In recent elections across West Africa opposition mantras of change have succeeded in convincing voters to oust incumbent governments. The five countries focused on in this edition of West Africa Insight - Nigeria, Ghana, The Gambia, Sierra Leone and Liberia - have all seen an opposition presidential candidate emerge victorious since 2015. But faced with significant challenges and high expectations how are they doing in office?

UN habita predicts that before 2050, the total urban population in Africa will grow from the current estimate of 400 million to in excess of 1.26 billion. By 2030 the urban population of West Africa will range from 46.2%(Guinea) to 63.1% (Ivory Coast); percentages which firmly place half of the region's population in currently, under served and overstretched cities.

Osun State was carved out of the old Oyo State on August 27, 1991, by the military regime of Ibrahim Babangida. The first democratically elected Governor of the State, Isiaka Adeleke, took office in January 1992 and governed till November 1993, when the military junta of Babangida dissolved all political offices, after the annulment of the June 12, 1993, Presidential election.

This journal comprises several articles on various subjects. In the first article on page 3: Taking on Gnassingbé, Africa's Last Strongmen, Wolali Ahlijah takes us inside the protest that begun in August 2017 to understand how they are continuing to face up to the repressive response of the state with help of social media and a more unified message.

This edition of West Africa Insight will look ahead to key issues and events set to play out in 2019. In February two of the region’s countries will hold presidential elections. Voters will cast their ballots on 16 February in Nigeria.

With the restoration of democratic order in The Gambia in early 2017, the West Africa region gained the attention of the world as a site of democratic consolidation in Africa. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) vehement rejection