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The Ondo State Governorship election slated for 16 November 2024 is the fifth off-cycle election to be conducted by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) since the 2023 general elections. Data from INEC indicates that 2,053,061 registered voters will be eligible to cast their ballots. INEC figures further indicate that out of a total of 89,777 Permanent Voters Cards (PVCs) belonging to recently registered voters, prospective voters have collected 55,859 PVCs, representing 62.2%. This level of enthusiasm in the PVC collection is perceived as an indication of the readiness of the electorate to participate in the electoral process.  However, myriads of challenges, which combine to constrain and depress the robust participation of voters in the electoral process remain to be confronted.  At a time when apprehension is rife in the West African Sub-region because of the coup contagion, and the democratic reversals, which have elicited a serious debate on how to safeguard, protect and promote democracy, the conversation around ensuring the integrity of the information ecosystem is as important as ever. As such, tackling information manipulation is now considered by pro-democracy advocates as one of the crucial steps to ensuring the triumph and supremacy of the voices and the votes of the electorate. It is to achieve this goal that a CDD-West Africa Team of assessors recently visited Ondo State for an assessment of the information environment. The objective of the assessment was to interact with and share the perspectives of key stakeholders in the electoral process. Specific focus of the assessment was about tracking the various strands of mis/disinformation and how they impact on the electoral process, particularly the participation of historically marginalized groups, including women, youth and persons with disabilities. One of the key findings of the assessment was the dominant narrative in the state alleging that the election of 16 November is already won and lost, and that there is no need for the electorate to approach the process with so much seriousness. Some stakeholders who provided their perspectives during the assessment were of the view that the lack of serious campaigning by the political actors beyond a few rallies was indicative of the absence of a keenly contested election.   Among the disinformation peddled in the campaign period, there have been narratives targeting INEC and various political party candidates. Identity-driven disinformation relating to the geographical origin of the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) trended a few days after the assessment commenced. Also, a video circulating on WhatsApp claimed the incumbent governor of the state was allegedly involved in a fight with his mistress in London. Based on the responses of interviewed respondents, this apparently false narrative gained traction because of the biases it generated. Respondents who weighed in on the viral disinformation alleged that the absence of the First Lady of the state for a considerable period, made the content quite relatable and believable. This apparently informed the wide shares the content has received and the push back against fact checkers who have made efforts to show that the individual captured in the footage is indeed not the governor of Ondo State.     

The ability of APC to unite its different factions, especially after a contentious primary, might be key to ensuring a strong showing. As with most elections in Nigeria, factors including identity and zoning, insecurity, information disorder and growing impassivity among voters will play a major role in how the elections are conducted. Another major point to note is the relative anonymity of major political gladiators on both sides, besides Aiyedatiwa and Agboola. This is of course in relative comparison to Edo, where former Governor Adams Oshiomhole and outgoing Governor Godwin Obaseki were more associated with the race than the candidates of their different parties. In Ondo, both Aiyedatiwa and Agboola have been front and centre, but more so as the prominent faces of their parties and less so by their individual clout. This bucks the trend of strong individuals overshadowing party structures in previous elections and provides some possible clues for how the two establishment parties might fare when the generation of founding fathers departs the stage. This paper seeks to unpack the question of Ondo’s political leaning and the important factors that will make or mar the election result. It will also proffer nuanced background analysis, especially in reviewing recent political clashes and the different considerations across the different geopolitical zones. Finally, while it does not shy from the overwhelming prediction that our team received from different discussions, it seeks to situate potential reasons in the wider context of Nigeria’s political landscape.

In the lead-up to the Edo State governorship election scheduled for September 21, a comprehensive information ecosystem assessment conducted by the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) War Room revealed a range of information manipulation strategies aimed at influencing public perception and undermining the electoral process. These strategies, often targeted at political figures, government institutions, and vulnerable groups, are designed to foster distrust and sway voter behaviour. One notable disinformation narrative falsely claimed that Governor Godwin Obaseki had taken the Oba of Benin to court, which was leveraged to exploit cultural sensitivities and create a voting backlash. Other narratives accused the governor of re-bagging Federal Government rice for distribution as state-provided palliatives, further sowing doubts about his governance. Gendered disinformation also emerged, targeting women in politics, particularly Edo’s First Lady, Betsy Obaseki, who was subjected to misogynistic attacks to undermine her influence.

The ninth Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) taking place in Beijing from 4th September to 6th September, 2024, marks the first in-person FOCAC since the Covid-19 pandemic. As China adopts a more cautious approach to lending in Africa, this forum is highly anticipated, with expectations of substantial African participation, continuing the trend of FOCAC being the most popular "One+Africa" summit.

Since Nigeria's return to electoral democracy in 1999, following a long period of coups and military rule, the democratic process of the country has not been without its own challenges, particularly regarding women's engagement in the political process (Hoffmann, Wallace, 2022). The last 24 years have not offered equal place to women and men in both elected and appointed political positions. Women have encountered barriers that differ from those men face. Sometimes, they are subjected to unfair scrutiny and held to higher standards. Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala, former Nigerian Minister of Finance, captures that reality eloquently when she submitted, “There is no right way to be a woman leader”(Gillard, Okonjo-Iweala, 2020). Since 1999, no Nigerian woman has been elected president, vice-president, or governor. Additionally, the number of seats occupied by women Senators, in each legislative session, has never gone above nine out of 109 seats. This low level of representation reflects the challenge that women still face in the country. This paper discusses how Nigerian women have fared in both elected and appointed political positions 24 years after the return to democracy. It investigates the historical representation of women in political positions, as well as the issues women in politics face in career progression. The paper expatiates on issues including constitutional limitations, cultural and religious bias, gendered information disorder, party structure, male alignment, and the roles of women leaders in major parties.

This briefing note discusses the current trends and possible scenarios in the lead up to the 2015 general elections and emphasizes the need for improved voter education.

Facing the ongoing crisis in Niger, ECOWAS stands at a crossroads. On the one hand, ECOWAS initial threat of military intervention triggered a backlash from various quarters. Burkina Faso and Mali rallied to support the Niger junta, portending a regional split. On the other hand, a less coercive response might throw ECOWAS central role in maintaining peace, security, and democracy in West Africa in doubt. What explains ECOWAS actions in Niger? What can ECOWAS learn from this crisis?

This essay seeks to explain the seeming persistence of political instability in Africa, in spite of the rapid spread of liberal democracy in the 1980s and 1990s.

This research brief discusses the African Satellite Digital television project which was officially launched in Nigeria in 2019 by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) highlighting its exportation of propaganda into rural Nigeria. Although government officials in Nigeria have lauded the for its potential to change the fortunes of rural dwellers across the country, there has been no account of beneficiaries' perception of the satellite TV project in Nigeria as well as its implementation across the continent.

This Briefing note recommends a multi-sectoral approach to ending the Boko Haram insurgency and recognises the several issues driving the insurgency.

The year 2023 in Nigeria was marked by a series of elections. In February, there were presidential and legislative elections, followed by gubernatorial contests in March, supplementary contests in April, and three off-cycle governorship elections in November. These electoral events were influenced by various factors, ranging from identity politics to the challenges faced by electoral and security institutions. In the aftermath of the fiercely contested elections, both local and foreign stakeholders remain concerned about the country’s security and political landscape. The challenges anticipated for the new administration are considerable, and this report aims to shed light on the intricate interplay between insecurity and electoral processes, providing insights for stakeholders to navigate the complex issues at hand. Security challenges are pervasive across the entire country. In the North-Central, conflicts between pastoralists and farmers over resources have been prominent. In the South-South zone, persistent oil-related militancy remains a significant concern. Secessionist movements in the South-East continue to cause challenges to the state, while the North-West and North-East have continued to grapple with militant jihadist groups and the proliferation of communal militias and other non-state armed groups. Finally, the South-West has witnessed increased clashes between the regional community militia and other groups, ranging from pastoralists to other security outfits. Despite former President Muhammadu Buhari’s administration (2015 – 2023) having been elected largely on the promise of addressing insecurity, these challenges persist under his successor. In ensuring Nigeria’s peace and stability, this report identifies three emerging post-election challenges that underscore the critical need to address the drivers of political violence, indicative of state-society relations and their impact on elections. First, in response to security and legitimacy concerns in the lead-up to and the immediate aftermath of the 2023 elections, the Nigerian government must prioritise addressing concerns related to marginalisation and identity. These concerns have been prominent factors contributing to electoral violence observed in all four elections this year, posing a substantial risk of further unrest. Second, considering the enduring influence and political power wielded by incumbent leaders, it is imperative for the Nigerian government to adopt a comprehensive strategy to address and mitigate the risks associated with the abuse of power manifested in leaders’ involvement in politics. Finally, the government must address citizens’ concerns that politicians exploit judicial actions to secure office through the courts, which has continued to exacerbate conflict, especially in areas where elections are keenly contested.

The 100 days report's cards presents a short term assessment of the performance of President Muhammadu Buhari (PMB) and his party, the All Progressives Congress (APC), on the delivery of campaign promises made in the run-up to the 2015 general elections.

For a country with a significant female population, Nigeria has been poor in ensuring gender parity in elected and appointed leadership positions. Since 1979, the country has practiced a presidential form of government, with a devolved form of government across three tiers—federal, state and local levels. Yet, despite the number of elective constituencies available, there has been little to no women elected to these positions. Nigeria has never elected a female president, vice-president or a governor in any of its thirty-six states. Women elected to the national legislature have been a scant percentage in any of the ten constituted sessions of either chamber, with none emerging as president of the senate and a roughly five-month stint for the only woman to emerge speaker of the House of Representatives. This paper overviews the history of political participation in women before reviewing the status of women in previous cabinets. It then highlights factors affecting appointments and challenges for women in post. Nigerian political literature is expanding on the covering the identity-based elements of its politics, but it is yet to properly address the role that cabinet appointments can play in correcting the gender imbalance in political leadership.

The research sheds light on the following dimensions of the crisis in the northwest: It analyses how the bandits mobilise popular support by exploiting political grievances in North-western communities, particularly with pastoralists, even as they fight primarily fight for personal gain. It finds that local vigilante forces, particularly the Hausa self-defence groups known as Yan Sakai, have helped fuel insecurity by engaging in egregious and indiscriminate human rights violations against Fulani and pastoralist communities; directly or indirectly pushing many pastoralists into banditry. Federal security forces have also sought to compensate for insufficient manpower and intelligence by profiling, harassing, or indiscriminately attacking pastoralists with little concern for collateral damage, exacerbating many of the underlying drivers of conflict.

The study sought to identify and document the root causes, dynamics and implications of the frequent act of rural banditry and other forms of violence in Northern Nigeria, and secondly make policy recommendations on how such a serious security challenge can be addressed.

Nigerians went to the polls for the third and final set of elections in 2023, with citizens in Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi electing state governors. These polls were conducted in the wake of contentious general elections that produced a new president, national legislators, and 28 state governors.

The 2015 general elections was shrouded in controversy over a power-sharing arrangement between groups bifurcated along ethnic, religious and regional lines. This took diverse dimensions at different levels of government.

In a violent end to the life of an entrepreneur of violence, Yevgeny V. Prigozhin, founder of the Wagner private military company (PMC), died in a jet crash on 23 August 2023 in Russia. Aboard the airplane were six other Wagner top leaders including Dmitry Utkin and Valery Chekalov. An admirer of the Third Reich, Dmitry Utkin alegedly played a key role in the founding of the PMC. He was, for example, rumored to have named the group “Wagner” in honor of Wilhelm Richard Wagner, Adolf Hitler’s favorite composer. Yevgeny V. Prigozhin was a controversial figure known for his close ties to the Russian government. His operations as a leader of Wagner have raised concerns about human rights violation, accountability, and their impact on global security. In June 2023, however, Prigozhin staged in mutiny against the Russian military leadership prompting observers to question the linkages between Wagner and the Kremlin. While Prigozhin’s death is a major blow to the Russian PMC, it would be extremely dangerous and short sighted to conclude that it marks the end of Wagner’s security and economic influence in Africa. This brief strategically discusses the scope of Wagner legacy in Africa before the death of its founder. It presents future possible scenarios and their implications for Africa.

The study revealed that displacement is the single most recurring and severe effect of cattle rustling and social conflicts across the five select LGAs in the state.