Why A State of Emergency in Rivers State is a Bad Idea
At around 6:45 PM WAT on Tuesday, March 18, 2025, President Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared a state of emergency in Rivers State, Nigeria, following over a year of political turmoil marked by escalating tensions and threats of violence. In his speech, the President referenced Section 305 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended) to justify the state of emergency. Indeed, Section 305, Subsection 3(d) of the Constitution allows the President to declare a state of emergency “where there is a clear and present danger breakdown of public order and public safety in the federation or any part thereof requiring extraordinary measures to avert such danger. This provision is somewhat open-ended as it fails to operationalise what constitutes a “clear or present danger of breakdown of public order and public safety.” Consequently, while the state of emergency meets the constitutionally prescribed condition, the condition itself lends itself to too much subjective interpretation. More so, a careful consideration of the origin and expansion of the conflict along with the political and security implications of the declaration raises concerns about the viability of a state of emergency as a tool for restoring order in Rivers State.
Understanding the Rivers State Political Crisis: From Godfatherism to Ethnic Politics
Nyesom Wike, the Honourable Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, claims to have chosen the now-suspended Rivers State Governor, Simi Fubara, as his successor. However, soon after the 2023 governorship election, a rift emerged between Fubara and Wike. While Fubara was accused of disloyalty, 27 House of Assembly members remained loyal to Wike, leaving only four aligned with Fubara. These 27 members became Wike’s political instruments in his conflict with Fubara. The crisis escalated when their seats were declared vacant on December 12, 2023 following their defection to the APC a day before—a decision that was recently overturned by the Supreme Court.
As the political impasse deepened, ethnic sentiments began to surface, particularly among the Ijaw community, who perceived the attempts to unseat Governor Fubara, an Ijaw, as a direct affront to their representation and rights and swore to defend him. This perception was exacerbated by subsequent inflammatory remarks by Wike, a federal appointee, which some viewed as an attempt at goading the Ijaws to violence and justifying a state of emergency. A few days after the remarks, there have been reports of pipeline explosions, evoking memories of the militant activities that plagued the Niger Delta in the mid-2000s.
Happenings in Rivers State closely mirror a re-enactment of the ‘wild-wild west’ of the defunct Western region in post-independence Nigeria where politics in the first republic intersected with ethnic politics prompting the federal government to declare a state of emergency in the region. While intended to restore order, this intervention contributed to a series of events that culminated in the first military coup of January 1966 and a counter coup – both which are viewed more with ethnic lens and ultimately the Nigerian Civil War (1967-1970).
The State of Emergency: A Double-Edged Sword
In response to the escalating crisis, President Tinubu’s declaration of a state of emergency entailed the suspension of Governor Fubara, his deputy, and all state lawmakers for an initial period of six months. Vice Admiral Ibokette Ibas (Rtd), a retired Chief Naval Staff of Cross River Origin and former Ambassador to Ghana under the Buhari-led administration, was appointed as Administrator, with the federal government assuming control pending National Assembly approval. The declaration is framed as necessary to restore order and protect democracy. The palpable threats of insecurity followed by the recent pipeline explosions lend credibility to the intervention to ‘restore order.’ However, several factors raise concern about the appropriateness and timeliness of the declaration in Rivers State.
First, comparing the scale of the security threats in Rivers State to those currently experienced in other parts of Nigeria raises doubts about whether restoring order is a genuine reason for declaring the state of emergency. Nigeria is a deeply fragmented and factionalised state with security threats of varying scales and magnitude dotted across the country. The threat of Boko-Haram/ISWAP subsists in the Northeast to contemporary times, in the Northeast and Northcentral, banditry and farmer-herder conflicts continue to claim lives. The Southeast has had a protracted phase of secessionist agitation with varying magnitudes of violence claiming lives and properties. Between May 2023 and April 2024, Nigeria recorded a staggering 614,937 fatalities due to insecurity. As 2024 drew to a close, a new Jihadist group, the Lakurawa Group, emerged. In 2025 alone, at least five people were killed and around 200 were kidnapped in Maru LGA of Zamfara, and 21 government-backed fighters were killed in Katsina State. These security issues, though arguably more threatening to order than the Rivers State crisis, have not resulted in an intervention to restore order as was done in Rivers State.
A state of emergency has only been declared five times in Fourth Republic Nigeria (including the recent declaration in Rivers State). The first was in Plateau State in 2004 by the President Obasanjo-led administration. The next was in Ekiti State in 2006 by the President Obasanjo-led administration. Another was declared in Borno, Plateau and Niger States in 2011 by the President Goodluck Jonathan-led administration. Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa States also experienced a state of emergency during the peak of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2014. All these states of emergency were strict responses to security threats on lives and properties, with only one exception which emerged from a political crisis, the declaration of a state of emergency in Ekiti State in 2006 by President Obasanjo-led administration. Even during the peak of the Niger Delta crisis, between 1999 and 2009 when the Presidential Amnesty Programme was declared, there was no single declaration of a state of emergency in the region. However, with the present spates of violence across Nigeria, the Nigerian state under the President Tinubu-led administration has prioritised a political crisis with no single casualty or fatality count over other instances of violence, resulting in an allegation of political motivation barely less than 12 hours following its declaration. The appointment of a former ambassadorial appointee of the APC-led administration (under Buhari) as Administrator further fuels the concerns about the political motives behind the federal intervention.
The declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State is also considered an ill-advised move by the Presidency due to the ethnic dimension of the simmering threats of resurgence of militancy in the Niger Delta. While the state of emergency in Rivers State may prevent future pipeline explosions in the state, the ethnic component infused in the conflict can serve as a mobilising tool for other attacks in other Niger Delta states especially those dominated by the Ijaws.
It is widely held that militancy in the region peaked following political issues that unseated former governors of Bayelsa and Delta States, Chief DSP Alamieyeseigha and James Ibori, respectively. Combining these antecedents with the simmering resurgence of militancy paints a very unsettling picture of the future of peace in the region.
A second factor is the possible political undertones and subsequent political implications. Although Wike remains a card-carrying member of the PDP, a federal-level opposition party and the state-level ruling party in Rivers State, he is also a member of the APC-led government’s cabinet, as Minister of the FCT. This position was secured following a heavily contested 2023 Presidential election and the role of the discord between the ‘G5 Governors’ and the PDP flag bearer which contributed to the defeat of the party during the election. The federal intervention could, thus, be interpreted as a move to support a ‘political ally’ or even strengthen the grip of his party, the APC, which already controls 20 of Nigeria’s 36 states. Although the party controls a majority of states, it has remained an opposition at the state level in five of the six south-south states. As 2027 approaches, the political crisis and seemingly lopsided federal intervention in Rivers State may be perceived as an attempt to gain control of political forces in the state. Related to this is the concern that there is a ploy to replicate in Rivers State, the entrenched patronage system in Lagos, where the ‘jagaban school of politics’ holds sway and predecessors continue to cling to power even after leaving office. It appears as though there is an institutionalisation of client-patron relationship, and this indicates a dangerous trend of state capture especially as Nigeria looks forward to the 2027 elections.
A final issue is the concern over potential human rights abuse by the military under the pretext of restoring order. While the military plays a key role in the protection of rights and property, the country’s military has a checkered track record of respect for human rights. There have been prior instances of brutalisation of civilians without cause and the state of emergency may incentivise similar incidents. More so, the proximity of the military to power at a time of growing concerns over military interventions in sub-Saharan Africa could pose further risks to democracy in the country.
Conclusion
The State of Emergency declared in Rivers State is a seemingly radical break from the trend in the exercise of the executive prerogative in Nigeria. It highlights how a tiny ripple at a shoreline can result in very turbulent waters deep within the ocean. A juxtaposition with antecedents of the Nigerian First Republic history, during which political crises, the politicisation of ethnicity, and threats of insecurity combined to justify a protracted disruption of civilian rule create concern over the future of democracy in Nigeria. This is even more pressing given the broader concerns over democratic decline, the recent rise of military rule in sub-Saharan Africa, and growing anti-West and pro-military populist sentiments in neighbouring states, notably: Niger, Mali and Burkina Faso. More so, the delicate nature of the Niger Delta region, with a history of poorly handled political tension contributing to tensions calls for a more cautionary approach to the crisis in Rivers State. A wrong move may not further erode the already poor state of democracy but may reverse gains made in restoring peace in the entire Niger Delta region.