Much Ado about FOCAC
The ninth edition of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) took place in Beijing last week, from 4 to 6 September. What began as a fledgling diplomatic endeavour in 2000 has matured into a central pillar of Sino-African relations, encompassing sectors such as trade, infrastructure, education, health, security, and governance. While the 2024 summit carried the expected pomp and pledges, it also brought to the surface critical questions regarding the depth and sustainability of the relationship for African countries.
Historical Context and China's Strategic Playbook
China’s interest in Africa is neither new nor spontaneous. It dates back to the days of shared colonial struggles, which Chinese leaders often cite as a basis for today’s “win-win” cooperation. This narrative was revived at the 2024 FOCAC summit, when Beijing reiterated its commitment to supporting Africa’s modernisation—a message aimed at reinforcing China’s position as Africa’s primary development partner. President Xi made several significant pledges, including $51 billion in financial support, expanded market access for African agricultural products, the exemption of 33 African countries from import tariffs, and $140 million in military assistance grants.
China’s commitment to educational exchanges and vocational training also played a significant role in the 2024 summit, with a pledge of 60,000 training opportunities for Africans. This represents an opportunity to address its human resource gap, particularly in sectors like technology and manufacturing. However, there are concerns about the ideological undertones embedded in these educational programs. As China exports not just skills but also its governance model, there are questions about how this might influence West Africa’s already fragile political trajectory. Will the lessons learnt from China foster sustainable growth? Or will they come at the expense of democratic ideals?
At the heart of China’s strategy is an intricate blend of economic, political, and military objectives. For West African nations, China’s engagement primarily focuses on economic development and infrastructure. The region is rich in raw materials, including oil, minerals, and agricultural products, which are vital to China’s ever-expanding industrial needs. Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Nigeria have become crucial suppliers of these resources, reinforcing their importance to China’s economy. As Africa’s largest economy, Nigeria holds a strategic position in this equation, serving not only as a resource base but also as a growing consumer market for Chinese goods.
West Africa has seen substantial Chinese investment in infrastructure projects, many of which fall under the ambit of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These projects are often hailed as transformative for the region’s connectivity and industrial capacity. For example, Ghana has the Bui Dam hydroelectricity; Nigeria has the Lagos-Ibadan railway; and Senegal has witnessed the construction of industrial parks and highways such as the Foundiougne Bridge, all funded by Chinese loans and investments. However, the concerns surrounding these projects— from transparency to debt sustainability—mirror larger continental apprehensions.
China, meanwhile, views its African infrastructure footprint as crucial to enhancing its political and diplomatic leverage, particularly within international organisations like the United Nations, where African nations represent a significant voting bloc. West African countries have largely aligned with China on several geopolitical issues, like the 1971 Beijing’s stance on Taiwan and its Belt and Road Initiative, its broader vision for global governance which African countries have largely signed on to.
From a geopolitical standpoint, FOCAC serves as a counterbalance to Western influence in Africa. China’s emphasis on “non-interference” and “mutual respect” appeals to many African nations, who have grown weary of Western-imposed conditions. Yet, this shift in power dynamics is not without its critics, particularly as African leaders weigh the benefits of this partnership against its hidden costs.
West Africa in the FOCAC Agenda
West Africa has become a focal point for China’s military and security interests on the continent. Through UN missions, Chinese peacekeepers have been deployed to conflict zones, while security cooperation, including military training and the sale of Chinese arms, has grown steadily. The construction of Chinese-funded ports and infrastructure along the West African coast also holds strategic military value should Beijing decide to expand its physical presence in the region.
One of the most prominent themes at FOCAC 2024 was the push for industrialisation in Africa. For countries like Nigeria, which has long struggled to move beyond the export of raw materials, this focus is crucial. Nigerian leaders have consistently called for partnerships that prioritise value-added production and job creation over resource extraction. However, industrialisation requires reliable energy infrastructure—a glaring challenge in Nigeria, where access to consistent electricity remains a distant dream. Without addressing this energy deficit, the lofty promises of FOCAC may ring hollow.
Agriculture remains the backbone of most West African economies, and agricultural modernisation was a major topic at the 2024 FOCAC summit. China’s involvement in this sector, particularly through technology transfer and agricultural training programs, is seen as a potential game-changer for West African countries looking to enhance food security and increase agricultural productivity.
In nations like Mali and Burkina Faso, where agriculture employs a significant portion of the population, Chinese investments in irrigation systems, farming technology, and value-added processing could help boost productivity and food security. However, concerns have been raised about the nature of these projects, particularly regarding their long-term sustainability and the risk of agricultural dependency on Chinese technology and inputs.
Nigeria’s debt to China, while not as severe as some of its African counterparts, is still a contentious issue. As Kenya has pointed out, loans from China must translate into tangible development outcomes, not debt traps. Nigeria’s history of loan mismanagement looms large, raising questions: is Nigeria truly negotiating from a position of strength? Or is it simply mortgaging its future for short-term gains?
The issue of debt highlights the need for the region and the wider continent to rethink its engagement with China. While infrastructure investments are undoubtedly necessary, the long-term implications of this financial dependency could undermine the very development they are meant to support.
China’s green energy projects in Africa, another focal point of FOCAC 2024, were welcomed by many African nations. However, the environmental impact of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects often sparks concern. While the commitment to renewable energy is promising, environmentalists argue that more stringent oversight is needed to ensure that these projects do not cause harm to local ecosystems. This is particularly relevant in Nigeria’s oil-rich but ecologically fragile Niger Delta, where development projects have historically led to environmental degradation.
Beyond the Headlines
While the 2024 FOCAC summit has been hailed as a diplomatic success, it exists within the broader ecosystem of Africa+1 summits, such as the Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD), the U.S.-Africa Leaders Summit, and the Russia-Africa Summit. These summits represent a growing trend of major global powers seeking deeper ties with African nations, each vying for influence on the continent through trade, investment, and diplomatic engagement.
Within this architecture, FOCAC holds significant leverage, but it also shares similar features with these summits—chief among them the widening gap between lofty promises and tangible outcomes. Scepticism over the gap between Chinese promises and actual delivery continues to grow.
The concern is not just about whether China delivers on its promises but also about whether the partnership is truly equitable. While FOCAC is branded as a platform for mutual cooperation, the reality is that China holds significant leverage. African nations, even the more economically powerful ones like Nigeria and South Africa, often find themselves in a reactive position with limited ability to influence the agenda or negotiate from a place of equal power.
A critical issue in FOCAC is China’s engagement with undemocratic nations. Unlike the U.S – Africa Summit, which tends to emphasise democratic governance and human rights, FOCAC operates under China’s principle of non-interference in domestic affairs. This approach allows China to work closely with authoritarian regimes across Africa without addressing governance concerns. While this policy appeals to some African leaders, it raises questions about the role China should—or could—play in promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability on the continent. The continued engagement with regimes that face allegations of human rights abuses, for example, has sparked criticism that China is enabling, or at least turning a blind eye to, undemocratic practices in Africa.
In conclusion, despite the substantial buzz and high-profile pledges at FOCAC 2024, the true impact of the summit remains to be seen. Issues like debt dependency and unequal power dynamics continue to cloud the “win-win” narrative that China promotes. Much like other Africa+1 summits, FOCAC faces similar concerns regarding the gap between ambitious promises and the transparency or sustainability of their implementation. For lasting progress, particularly in West Africa, African nations will need more than diplomatic gestures; they must secure tangible results and assert greater influence over these partnerships.
Gbemisola Adebowale is an Information Disorder Analyst at the Centre for Democracy and Development.