Is the Alliance of the Sahelian States a Viable Alternative to ECOWAS?

On 29 January 2024, ECOWAS officially acknowledged the exit of the Sahelian countries (Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger), marking a significant turning point in West Africa’s regional politics. The three nations under military regimes had declared their intention to leave ECOWAS with immediate effect a year ago.  News reports indicate widespread jubilation in these departing nations, reflecting a deep-rooted dissatisfaction with ECOWAS and the perceived benefits of their new trajectory. However, while the transition appears smooth on the surface, the reality is far more complex and laden with geopolitical, economic, and security implications.

Unlike its earlier reaction to military coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger where it imposed economic sanctions and threatened military intervention, ECOWAS has adopted a more measured approach this time. The bloc has chosen to maintain open borders, allowing citizens of the Sahelian states to retain their freedom of movement and other privileges previously enjoyed under ECOWAS membership.  Before ECOWAS' decision, the Sahelian countries had already extended similar courtesies to ECOWAS members in December 2024.

This approach may prevent immediate economic shocks and social disruptions, but it creates a precedent where states can enjoy the benefits of regional integration without fulfilling their obligations. ECOWAS has long struggled with enforcement mechanisms for its protocols, and this latest development further complicates matters.

Obligation to ECOWAS Protocols

One of ECOWAS’ fundamental challenges has been the failure of member states to uphold their commitments. The ECOWAS Protocol on Free Movement of Persons, for instance, which was first adopted in 1979, guarantees mobility across borders but also imposes documentation and regulatory obligations on states and citizens alike. In practice, poor enforcement has led to arbitrary border closures, harassment of travellers, and widespread smuggling. Similarly, the ECOWAS Protocol on Transhumance established in 1998 and revised in 2003 to regulate cross-border pastoralism, has been poorly implemented. The protocol requires herders to register their livestock, obtain permits, and adhere to designated grazing corridors. However, many herders fail to meet these obligations, exacerbating conflicts between farmers and pastoralists. As a result, tensions between ECOWAS members have increased, with countries blaming one another for insecurity and resource competition.

With the Sahelian states now outside ECOWAS, enforcing transhumance regulations will become even more challenging. The absence of a unified framework may lead to more conflicts, as countries may adopt divergent policies with little coordination.

Security, Economic, and Environmental Risks

The withdrawal of the Sahelian countries from ECOWAS poses significant security risks as they are all at the epicentre of terrorism, banditry, and organised crime in West Africa. Regional security frameworks, such as the ECOWAS Standby Force and intelligence-sharing mechanisms, rely on cooperation among member states. Therefore, the absence of Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger from these arrangements weakens counterterrorism efforts, as armed groups operate seamlessly across borders. Non-state violent actors have demonstrated remarkable coordination across countries over the years, whereas governments remain fragmented in their responses.  The Sahelian exit further makes a unified security approach appear elusive.

Beyond the strict security lens, the withdrawal undermines socio-economic and environmental cooperation and reinforces conflict in the region. For example, climate change disproportionately affects West Africa, with desertification and erratic rainfall patterns posing severe threats to agriculture and livelihoods. Addressing these challenges requires coordinated regional responses rather than fragmented approaches that operate in silos. Regional economic integration efforts, such as the ECOWAS Common External Tariff (CET) and the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ), also face setbacks. It is now likely that the Sahelian countries will now negotiate separate agreements with ECOWAS members disrupting age long supply chains and trade corridors in the region.

The Illusion of Pan-Africanism: Shifting Alliances and Foreign Influence

Some analysts see the current rupture as part of a dialectical process that could either strengthen ECOWAS into a more effective regional bloc or lead to the creation of an entirely new structure better suited to the region’s needs. It appears to them that this is effectively the renaissance of Pan-Africanism. While Africa longs for Pan-Africanism and freedom from imperial powers, the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) raises several concerns. These concerns may not necessarily align with the goal of fostering collaboration among Africans and African governments in contemporary times, despite the populist narratives surrounding it. For example, the alliance is composed of military-led governments, which means policies will likely be imposed through decrees rather than inclusive consultations. AES appears to prioritize military solutions to regional crises, neglecting economic and diplomatic strategies. Unlike ECOWAS, which has built a governance framework for nearly five decades, AES lacks institutional depth and experience in regional administration. Moreover, the authoritarian nature of the Sahelian governments suggests that their leaders will consolidate power under the guise of national security, delaying promised democratic transitions. This will create gaps in effective collaboration between  African countries that are under democratic governments and the military governments of the Sahelian countries.

The Sahelian countries have also labelled ECOWAS as a lackey of foreign powers and an instrument that fosters neo-colonialism. Indeed, Pan-African institutions are not at their strongest, particularly when it comes to speaking out against the questionable practices of foreign powers on the continent. However, it is difficult to separate this from the frequent defaults by member states that have left ECOWAS increasingly reliant on foreign donors. Moreover, the Sahelian states cannot separate themselves from the reality that their past alignment with France, which further deepened the Anglo-Francophone divide also contributed to this weakness. The current pivot toward Russia under the banner of security and Pan-Africanism does not help either as it raises questions about the long-term sovereignty and economic viability of the Sahelian countries and the broader West African region. Russia’s primary interests in the region revolve around military cooperation and access to natural resources, rather than fostering genuine economic and political independence.

Moving Forward: Competition or Collaboration?

Despite its shortcomings, ECOWAS has made substantial contributions to regional integration. It has facilitated economic cooperation, conflict resolution, and democracy promotion. Notable successes include democratic interventions, where ECOWAS has played a pivotal role in restoring constitutional order in countries like The Gambia in 2017 and Côte d’Ivoire between 2010 and 2011. Economic integration has been promoted through trade liberalization and infrastructural connectivity across the region. Additionally, ECOWAS has deployed peacekeeping forces in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Mali, showcasing its commitment to regional stability.

As ECOWAS approaches its 50th anniversary, it stands at a crossroads. The current crisis should serve as an opportunity for introspection and reform. The bloc must address its enforcement weaknesses, enhance financial self-sufficiency, and prioritize people-centred policies over elite-driven agendas. At the same time, the rivalry between ECOWAS and AES should not escalate into open hostility. Rather, both entities should explore areas of cooperation, particularly in security, trade, and environmental protection. The real competition should be in governance effectiveness, demonstrating whether ECOWAS’ democratic model or AES’ military-driven approach yields better outcomes.

Ultimately, no foreign power has the region’s best interests at heart. The fate of West Africa must be decided by West Africans themselves. Whether through ECOWAS, AES, or a reformed hybrid structure, the priority should be genuine development, stability, and the welfare of the people. This moment calls for leadership, not division. It is time to prove whether ECOWAS remains the better model or whether the AES experiment will usher in a new era of regional governance. The true test lies not in rhetoric but in action. After all, the ECOWAS we have today, with its strengths and deficiencies, reflects the quality of governance of its member states. Similarly, the AES will not grow beyond the character of the countries that created it.