“Demorecrazier” It Gets: Anticipating the Implications of the Rivers Crisis on Nigeria’s 2027 Elections
We are witnessing one of the most consequential political crises in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic. The escalating rift between the state governor, Siminalayi Fubara and his predecessor, the current Minister of the Federal Capital Territory, Nyesom Wike, has taken a troubling dimension. What began as yet another episode of godfatherism—a recurring plague in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic—has spiralled into a crisis so severe that a state of emergency has been declared, evoking memories of the nation’s fraught political past and military interventions in governance.
To call the situation “crazy” would be euphemistic. With the suspension of the governor and state assembly, the appointment of a military administrator, and a resurgence of militant activity following the president’s declaration, it seems our democracy is teetering on the edge of deeper chaos. The “demorecrazier” it gets, the more Nigeria’s democratic stability is at stake. This situation calls for a critical examination of the crisis, its evolving dimensions, and its implications for the future, especially for the 2027 elections.
Understanding the Rivers Crisis
The crisis in Rivers State is historically linked to its wealth from oil production, which has motivated both local and federal politicians to vie for control. The cast of characters has changed over time, but the underlying plot remains the same. The current dimensions of conflict, ignited by the rift between Wike and Fubara—once close allies—are reminiscent of the earlier conflict between Wike and Amaechi.
The rift between Rotimi Amaechi and Nyesom Wike is one of the most intense political rivalries in Nigeria, rooted in personal ambition, party loyalty, and control over Rivers State’s political structure. Amaechi and Wike were once political allies under the People’s Democratic Party (PDP). When Amaechi became Governor of Rivers State in 2007 (after a legal battle that nullified Celestine Omehia’s victory), he appointed Wike as his Chief of Staff, further strengthening their bond. However, their relationship began to deteriorate due to disagreements over succession planning.
By 2013, Amaechi had fallen out with then-President Goodluck Jonathan and his wife, Patience Jonathan, who had significant influence on Rivers’ politics. The crisis led to Amaechi defecting from the PDP to the All Progressives Congress (APC), while Wike remained loyal to the PDP. Wike was reportedly backed by Patience Jonathan and emerged as the PDP’s governorship candidate in 2015, despite Amaechi’s opposition. The 2015 governorship election in Rivers State was fiercely contested, with allegations of rigging, violence, and intimidation. Wike won the election, but Amaechi and the APC rejected the results, leading to prolonged legal battles. Eventually, Wike remained governor, solidifying his power base in the state while working to dismantle Amaechi’s influence.
During Wike’s tenure, both politicians frequently traded accusations. Wike accused Amaechi of corruption, particularly regarding the sale of state assets and alleged mismanagement of funds during his tenure. Amaechi, on the other hand, accused Wike of running Rivers State with impunity and fostering insecurity. By 2019, the feud had intensified. Amaechi, as a key figure in President Muhammadu Buhari’s APC-led government, sought to reclaim Rivers State for the party. However, the APC’s internal crisis led to court rulings that prevented its candidate, Tonye Cole, from contesting the election, giving Wike an easier path to re-election.
Wike repeatedly mocked Amaechi over the APC’s failure to field a candidate, while Amaechi accused Wike of using state resources and security agencies to intimidate opponents.
As the 2023 elections approached, Wike fell out with the PDP leadership after failing to secure the party’s presidential ticket. This led him to align with the APC-led federal government, where he was later appointed as the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) by President Bola Tinubu. This move significantly altered Rivers’ political dynamics, with Wike seemingly taking over the role of APC’s powerbroker in the state, sidelining Amaechi.
However, unlike past conflicts, the present crisis, linked with the dark and recurring underbelly of godfatherism and the struggle for state resources in the oil-rich state, has developed new dimensions, with ethnic sentiments and perceived federal government interests at the fore. The Ijaws, a significant majority of Rivers State’s population, perceive the treatment of the governor, an Ijaw himself, as an attack on them. Wike, on the other hand, is perceived to be a recipient of significant support from the presidency in this crisis due to the key role he played in Tinubu’s victory in the keenly contested 2023 polls. The president’s recent move to suspend the governor and the state legislature and declare a state of emergency is seen as further proof of this support.
The president’s decision has sparked serious debates. While the declaration is backed by Section 305 of the Nigerian Constitution, legal experts have argued that the circumstances in Rivers do not fit the enabling criteria outlined in the Constitution. Meanwhile, those who support the government’s stance argue that the governor’s suspension is warranted because of his active stakes in the present state of the conflict. Rivers is not the first instance of the federal government declaring a state of emergency in a state, as a similar circumstance arose in the Western Region in 1962, in Jos and Ekiti in 2004 and 2006 respectively under Olusegun Obasanjo, and more recently during the height of the Boko Haram insurgency in 2013 under Goodluck Jonathan. However, the context of these emergencies differs significantly from the present Rivers crisis. In any case, the Goodluck Jonathan administration did not suspend the governments of the states—Borno, Adamawa, and Yobe—where the emergency was declared.
Siminalayi Fubara’s six-month suspension, alongside the dissolution of the legislature, raises troubling questions about democratic stability. The prospect of a military-administered interim government, even temporarily, casts a shadow over Nigeria’s democratic integrity and the credibility of the upcoming 2027 electoral process.
Is the 2027 Elections at Risk?
Nigeria’s precarious democracy faces another test with the current debacle. This crisis, combined with the recently declared state of emergency, may have serious implications for electoral credibility and voter participation. Firstly, the government's suspension in the state is an act of disenfranchisement towards the people of Rivers State, whose elected representatives have been sidelined. Much like a putsch, a military-administered interim government has been imposed on them. This situation threatens to further erode the electorate's already limited faith in the electoral process.
Secondly, another ignored dynamic of the Federal government’s decision which threatens the elections and by extension, democracy, is the view that Fubara’s suspension represents federal government backing of Wike because of his alleged facilitation of electoral fraud in the president’s favour within the state. This is certain to negatively influence the behaviour of the political elite and electorates. This may lead to widespread political apathy or encourage electoral fraud as the case may be.
Also, as evidenced by the recent attacks on the petroleum infrastructure in the state, this decision could fuel a security crisis especially if militancy at its pre-presidential amnesty height resumes within the region. A state of insecurity will certainly limit electoral involvement and participation thereby affecting the electoral process. In addition, the federal government’s decision to involve the military in the Rivers crisis may be interpreted as a willingness for the administration to use them and other institutions of state control to intimidate voters and the opposition. The issue of voter intimidation has been a key electoral issue in Nigeria’s fourth republic, and the present situation will only serve to fuel fear of recurrence in 2027.
Finally, the River State crisis will have serious implications for political alliances within the nation. Members of the opposition and political analysts have interpreted the federal government’s handling of the issue — especially military deployment — as a form of intimidation. Fubara’s membership of the PDP, the country’s major opposition party, lends a simulacrum of credence to this allegation. Thus, whichever way the opposition political parties choose to handle this perceived affront will impact the 2027 elections.
What Can Be Done?
While the immediate and prospective implications of the Rivers State’s crisis appear bleak, the situation provides a perfect launch pad for the country’s democracy to emerge stronger if the right policies and practices are considered. The necessity of dialogue and conflict resolution in the success of democracy cannot be overstated; the Rivers crisis and the Nigerian democratic scene will benefit from improved dialogue and conflict resolution efforts. In Rivers State’s case, important stakeholders in the state and nation should be involved in facilitating these efforts, especially during the Governor’s temporary suspension.
Also, electoral reforms geared towards improving the credibility of elections should be considered. Such reforms can come in the form of stiffer penalties for those involved in electoral fraud, as well as renewed attempts at enhancing the independence of INEC. Accordingly, the independence of the government’s arms should be encouraged so that such reforms can be proposed and upheld without interference and undue influence by individual administrations.
The entire electorate, pressure groups, civil society organisations (CSOs), and NGOs have a key role to play in ensuring that these positive changes are put in place, thereby safeguarding our democracy. This role and its benefits will only be enhanced by the cohesive collaboration to advocate for and apply pressure to ensure these reforms and reconciliatory dialogue are adopted in this issue and other crises affecting our democracy.
Conclusion
Rivers State’s crisis increasingly seems like a Rubicon moment for the nation’s democracy because its present dynamics are a culmination of all that is wrong about our democracy and democratic institutions— Godfatherism, hybrid tendencies of autocracy, ethnic sentiments, and weak democratic institutions. With the looming 2027 elections, we risk further exacerbating the decay of our fragile democracy if we do not address this problem. However, the crisis provides the perfect avenue for the nation and its political stakeholders to address these evils bedevilling our democracy and ensuring that our institutions and the democratic principle in the nation emerge stronger than they entered this consequential political crisis.
Dorothy Ibifuro Fakrogha is an Admin Assistant at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD-West Africa)