A New Era for the African Union: Mahmoud Ali Youssouf’s Leadership Amidst Continental Challenges
The African Union (AU) stands at a pivotal moment in its history. The election of Mahmoud Ali Youssouf as the new Chairperson of the AU Commission comes as the continent faces significant challenges, including escalating conflicts in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and Sudan. Beyond security concerns, Africa grapples with the far-reaching impacts of climate change, the complexities of artificial intelligence adoption and regulation, and the socioeconomic strain of a growing youth population facing widespread underemployment. Youssouf's leadership prompts critical questions about the AU’s future direction: Can the organisation evolve from a reactive entity to a proactive force addressing these pressing issues? Will Youssouf’s tenure usher in a more decisive AU that takes ownership of its development, security, and governance agendas?
The recent AU elections in Addis Ababa highlighted the political manoeuvring characteristic of African multilateral diplomacy. The AU Commission Chairperson is elected through a competitive process involving negotiations among regional blocs, reflecting the AU’s commitment to regional balance. This election was particularly contested within the East African bloc, where Djibouti’s Youssouf faced Kenya’s Raila Odinga and Madagascar’s Richard Randriamandrato. Youssouf’s victory after multiple rounds underscores Djibouti’s growing influence and strategic alliances within the AU.
Meanwhile, the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) elections followed the usual regional representation pattern, with Nigeria maintaining its de facto permanent seat for West Africa. Eswatini’s sole candidacy was challenged by South Africa, leading to tensions. Eventually, Eswatini withdrew, and South Africa assumed the chairmanship, reflecting the AU’s struggle with regional power dynamics.
The Legacy of Past AU Leaders: Continuity or Change?
To understand the significance of Mahmoud Ali Youssouf’s election as Chairperson of the African Union Commission, it is essential to examine the legacy of past AU leaders and how their tenures shaped the institution. Since its transformation from the organisation of African Unity (OAU) to the AU in 2002, the organisation has struggled to balance sovereignty and non-interference with a more interventionist approach to continental issues.
The effectiveness of the AU has largely depended on its chairpersons’ leadership styles, political alliances, and institutional challenges. While each leader brought unique priorities, certain patterns persisted, raising the question of whether Youssouf’s leadership will continue past trends or mark a shift. Alpha Oumar Konaré, the first Chairperson, played a crucial role in shaping the AU’s institutional framework. His tenure focused on moving the AU beyond the OAU’s non-interference stance, advocating for stronger peace and security mechanisms. Under his leadership, the AU deployed its first peacekeeping mission to Burundi (AMIB) in 2003. However, financial and military limitations were evident, particularly in Sudan’s Darfur conflict, where an AU-led force struggled due to underfunding before it was absorbed by the UN.
Jean Ping (2008–2012) inherited both institutional ambitions and internal divisions. His tenure was marked by the AU’s failure to prevent NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, a turning point that weakened the AU’s financial autonomy due to Gaddafi’s removal. Gaddafi was not just a controversial and hard-mouthed figure on the international stage, he was also a major financial supporter of the AU. The AU’s inability to influence Libya’s transition after Gaddafi’s death exposed its limited authority in managing major continental crises. Ping also faced leadership rivalries among powerful member states like South Africa, Nigeria, and Ethiopia. His failure to secure re-election in 2012 was due to diplomatic manoeuvring by South Africa, which backed its own Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma.
Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma (2012–2017), the first woman to lead the AU Commission, emphasised institutional reforms and long-term development, particularly through Agenda 2063. While this strategic vision focused on economic transformation and infrastructure, critics argued that her leadership lacked decisive security interventions. The AU struggled to address immediate crises, including Boko Haram’s rise and escalating violence in the Sahel. Her tenure also saw continued instability in South Sudan, where AU-led peace efforts failed to produce a lasting ceasefire.
Moussa Faki Mahamat (2017–2024) prioritised conflict mediation but faced a continent increasingly beset by instability. His tenure saw initiatives like Silencing the Guns by 2030, aimed at reducing armed conflicts. However, the AU struggled with enforcement as conflicts in the Sahel, Ethiopia, and the DRC escalated. The Tigray conflict in Ethiopia underscored the AU’s limitations, with direct negotiations sidelining its mediation. His tenure also witnessed a surge in military coups in Mali, Guinea, Burkina Faso, and Niger. Although the AU suspended these countries, it failed to restore civilian rule, highlighting its limited influence over member states.
Despite these challenges, Mahamat expanded the AU’s diplomatic engagement with global partners. However, critics argue that his tenure was reactive rather than proactive. Youssouf now inherits a leadership shaped by persistent conflicts, financial dependency on external donors, and the growing autonomy of regional blocs like ECOWAS. His ability to unify AU member states, secure funding, and enforce peace agreements will determine whether his tenure signals a more effective AU or a continuation of past limitations.
The Sahel Crisis and AU’s Response Under Youssouf
The Sahel region has become one of Africa’s most volatile areas, experiencing a surge in terrorist activities, military coups, and geopolitical tensions. The security situation has deteriorated rapidly, with Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger facing escalating jihadist insurgencies that have triggered mass displacement and humanitarian crises. In response, military juntas have taken power in several states, straining relations with traditional Western security partners like France and the United States.
One of Youssouf’s most urgent challenges as AU Chairperson will be redefining the organisation’s role in stabilising the Sahel. The collapse of the French-led Operation Barkhane and the withdrawal of international forces from Mali and Niger have created a security vacuum, which extremist groups like ISIS and Al-Qaeda-affiliated factions have exploited. In this context, the AU faces a difficult decision: Should it take a more assertive role by deploying peacekeeping troops, or should it focus on strengthening local security forces through technical and logistical support?
Youssouf has expressed his preference for African-led solutions, arguing that the AU must take greater ownership of peacekeeping and counterterrorism efforts. However, the African Standby Force (ASF), originally designed in 2003 as a rapid-response mechanism for crises like those in the Sahel, has struggled to function as intended. While some regional standby forces have seen limited deployments, the ASF as a fully operational continental force remains hindered by political divisions among member states, inconsistent funding, and the reluctance of national governments to cede security responsibilities to a supranational force.
An Africa-centred response to the crisis in the Sahel under Youssouf’s leadership would require balancing security and diplomatic considerations. One approach could involve providing direct support to military-led governments, reinforcing their counterinsurgency efforts to stabilise the region. However, doing so could legitimise regimes that came to power through unconstitutional means and could undermine the AU’s commitment to democratic governance. Alternatively, the AU could focus on diplomatic engagement, bringing these governments back into regional dialogue while pushing for an AU-led counterterrorism mission. The success of such a mission, however, would hinge on overcoming the structural weaknesses of the ASF, securing sustained funding, and ensuring political cohesion among AU member states to deploy a coordinated and effective response.
Beyond military responses, the AU must also tackle the root causes of instability in the Sahel, including poor governance, economic marginalisation, and resource-based conflicts. Youssouf has emphasised the need for a comprehensive security strategy that integrates development initiatives, conflict mediation, and socioeconomic reforms to address the grievances fueling extremism. This approach aligns with the AU’s Silencing the Guns initiative, which aims to end armed conflicts in Africa by 2030. However, for this initiative to be effective, Youssouf must push for stronger political commitment from AU member states and enhance coordination with international partners such as the United Nations and the African Development Bank.
The Role of the AU in Mediating the Political Crises in West and Central Africa
Beyond the Sahel, governance crises in West and Central Africa may demand the AU’s intervention. Military takeovers in Burkina Faso, Guinea, Mali, and Niger threaten democratic stability, while tensions in Chad, Cameroon, and the Central African Republic (CAR) have resulted in more than 300,000 refugees and over 630,000 IDPs, this highlights the AU’s weak enforcement capacity. Its Peace Support Operations (PSO) have struggled with consistency in addressing unconstitutional changes in government. Youssouf’s leadership will be tested in navigating these crises. While the AU suspended Mali and Guinea after their coups, efforts to restore civilian rule have been limited. The AU’s reliance on punitive measures rather than proactive interventions has proven ineffective. Past stabilisation missions, like AFISMA in Mali and MISCA in CAR, have been largely reactive, often responding to crises rather than preventing them. Critics argue that AU sanctions have been inconsistently applied, undermining its democratic credibility.
Under Youssouf, a stronger focus on political mediation backed by PSO mechanisms could emerge. Instead of relying solely on suspensions and sanctions, the AU may prioritise negotiating power transitions, working with ECOWAS and the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS). A structured early warning system and rapid deployment of peace envoys could strengthen AU-led stabilisation efforts, making the organisation a more proactive and credible force in addressing governance crises.
The Democratic Republic of Congo and Rwanda’s Ongoing Dispute
A significant security issue facing the African Union (AU) is the rising tensions between the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and Rwanda, primarily driven by the resurgence of the M23 rebel group in eastern Congo. The DRC has accused Rwanda of backing these rebels, a claim that Rwanda has denied. This conflict has worsened recently, leading to mass displacement and creating a precarious situation along the DRC-Rwanda border. At a recent AU summit in Addis Ababa, the organisation called for an immediate and unconditional ceasefire in the DRC and urged the reopening of critical supply routes and Goma’s airport. However, diplomatic tensions remain high, and previous peace efforts have often failed to produce lasting results.
Prior to becoming the new Chairperson of the AU Commission, Youssouf was Djibouti’s Minister of Foreign Affairs since 2005. Unlike his predecessors at the head of AU, who have taken a cautious approach to the DRC-Rwanda dispute, Youssouf may adopt a more assertive stance in negotiations between Kinshasa and Kigali. However, his leadership comes with complexities. As former foreign minister of Djibouti—a small but strategically important country hosting foreign military bases from China, the U.S., France, Japan, and Italy—he has experience navigating global power dynamics. Yet, this heavy foreign military presence in his home country also exposes a potential weakness. That is, Youssouf's ability to assert independent African solutions may be constrained by external influences. While his diplomatic expertise is undoubtedly an asset, balancing these foreign interests at home while championing AU-led initiatives will be a key test of his leadership.
Leveraging this experience, Youssouf could work to strengthen Africa’s strategic autonomy by pushing for greater regional security coordination, securing sustainable funding for AU-led interventions, and engaging both African and international stakeholders in peace efforts. His diplomatic expertise may prove crucial in ensuring that external actors support, rather than dictate, African security initiatives, reinforcing the AU’s role in conflict resolution across the continent.
Youssouf is also a strong proponent of increased African representation on global platforms, including advocating for a permanent seat for Africa on the United Nations Security Council. His experience and strategic positioning could enhance Africa’s bargaining power in international affairs, fostering regional stability and promoting necessary governance reforms.
As the Chair of the Commission, Youssouf has a unique opportunity to make a positive impact on the continent. However, before he can effect meaningful change in Africa, he must first address and reform the organisation he leads. This requires streamlining AU decision-making processes to ensure swifter responses to crises, securing sustainable funding to reduce reliance on external donors, and reinforcing the operational capacity of the African Standby Force. Additionally, prioritising stronger enforcement of AU policies and fostering deeper coordination among member states will be essential in determining whether his tenure will truly usher in a more decisive AU that takes ownership of its development, security, and governance agendas.
Peter Yohanna Kazahchiang is an Assistant Programmes Officer at the Centre for Democracy and Development