CLAIM: Tinubu’s daughter is opposed to her father’s desperation to be president.
CONTEXT: A viral Twitter post, attributed to belong to the daughter of the All Progressive Congress presidential nominee, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, shows her cautioning him to drop his presidential ambition on the grounds that he is not fit for the position. In the video, the woman called Tinubu her father at different points while making her point.
VERIFICATION: Checks conducted by our partners at Daily Trust revealed that the caption is misleading as the video was originally posted on Instagram by an activist and Instagram influencer, Adetoun Onajobi on her official page, (justadetoun) in July.
Further checks gathered that she referred to Tinubu as her “father” in the video figuratively, because she considers him a father out of respect and the relationship he has with her husband. This is supported by her interview on the Channels TV show, Rubbin’ Minds, that “Tinubu is like a father to me but I will never endorse him.”
We can confirm that the video is misleading and was not made by any of Tinubu’s biological children.
WHY WE FACT-CHECKED THIS: The claim was done to avert any attempt to discredit any candidate based on fake news and misinformation.
CLAIM: CDD fact checkers spotted a trending tweet by Daniel Bwala, a lawyer and until recently served as a special adviser on legal matters to the Deputy Senate President, Ovie Omo-Agege.
On August 1, 2022, Mr. Bwala claimed there are about 190,000 polling units in Nigeria. He also maintained that a minimum of three-party agents are required at the polling unit.
The tweet reads: “There are about 190k polling units in Nigeria. A party needs a minimum of 3 agents in each polling unit; 570k human beings in total. “That’s structure existing not on social media. Anyway, it will be clearer as we approach elections. Insult is not a substitute for structure”.
FACT CHECK PROCESS: CDD Fact check on the claim indicated that Daniel Bwala’s data were inaccurate. As at August 2, 2022, the tweet has garnered over 3,000 (626 retweets, 190 Quotes and 2,333 likes) engagements and still growing.
According to the Election Management Body, there are 176,846 polling units listed on the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) website. INEC, on June 16th, 2021, removed polling units from ‘inappropriate’ places and worship centers across the country. The commission’s chairman, Mahmood Yakubu, disclosed this at a meeting with Resident Electoral Commissioners (RECs) in Abuja.
At the meeting, he unveiled the locations of the newly created 56,872 Polling Units (PUs) and also announced other electoral arrangements. With the creation of the new PUs, Mr. Yakubu said, Nigeria now has 176,846 full-fledged polling units against its initial 119,974 PUs in the 36 states and the Federal Capital Territory (FCT). He pegged the total number of polling units removed from ‘inappropriate places’ at 749.
Mr Bwala also claimed a party needs a minimum of three party agents in each polling units. Fact check on INEC’s pocketbook for party agents, clearly state that a political party is limited to one agent in each of polling units, as against three agents claimed by Mr. Bwala.
CONCLUSION: CDD fact-checkers can confirm that there are 176,846 polling units in Nigeria and not about 190,000. Additionally, there is a limit of one agent rather than three per polling unit as claimed by Mr. Bwala.
Mr. Bwala’s data on his tweet are wrong and therefore false.
As the country heads to 2023 general elections, there are several misleading contents online, CDD therefore urges citizens and voters to be careful of content they share, online and offline.
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has been described as China’s most ambitious push for a dominant role in global geopolitics and trade. Launched in 2013 by China`s President Xi Jinping the overarching goal of the BRI is to promote interconnectivity and partnership among countries along the ancient maritime silk road which spans Asia, Eastern Africa, Eastern Europe and the Middle East. The US-based Council on Foreign Relations estimates that 139 countries that have signed up to the BRI: 49 of the 54 African nations are signatories.1 In 2020, the African Union and China signed an agreement to promote the BRI in Africa, becoming the first agreement signed between China and a regional body to jointly promote the initiative. The BRI has three fundamental objectives: to explore drivers of global growth in the post–great recession era, to rebalance globalization, and to create new models for regional cooperation in the twenty-first century. It is underpinned by five components: policy coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people bonds. The people-to-people segment is where media sits in the ecology of the BRI.
An action point from the Forum on Africa-China Cooperation (FOCAC) in Dakar in 20212 was for the two sides to “actively promote exchanges and cooperation in the field of press and publication”. But the going out’ campaign of the Chinese media was first launched in response to the Western media’s framing of events leading up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. This, along with China’s increasing bilateral trade with Africa, provided an important background to its media expansion on the continent. It was eager to counterbalance international media coverage of China’s engagement within Africa, that framed it as being driven by self-interest and a desire for natural resources. In 2007, with the objective to tell a different story of China-Africa relations and support from former prime minister, Wen Jiabao, who urged China to extend its cultural engagement with other countries, the country’s efforts to shape the African it was confirmed that Chinese media outlets going international would receive funding to enable them ‘present a true picture of China to the world. By 2006, the Africa regional editorial office of Xinhua News Agency had already relocated from Paris to Nairobi. But in 2010 it commenced mobile news delivery. These developments were followed in 2011 by the establishment of China Central Television – now renamed China Global Television Network (CGTN) – in Nairobi, the first and largest bureau of CGTN outside China. The following year saw the launch of the African edition of Xinhuanet, an online service of the Xinhua News Agency (XNA). The Economist estimates that China now spends as much as US$10 billion annually on its media internationalization project globally.
However, there are growing fears that Chinese media expansion into Africa is impeding freedom of expression4 and engendering limited professional autonomy among journalists. This, in part, accounts for why Chinese presence in the media space on the continent continues to elicit widespread anxiety both within the industry and among outside observers. While some express concern over the authoritarian model employed by Chinese media, others are worried about how its narrative may impinge on, and indirectly impact, the continent’s fragile democratic space.
On the whole, Chinese media outlets subscribe to a model of journalism that emphasizes ‘positive reporting’ over the western model of ‘watchdog journalism’ that seeks to hold leadership to account. This ‘positive reporting’ model of journalism entails collaboration between the media and government which limits scrutiny of the latter’s actions. There are concerns that if Chinese media replicate this model of journalism in West Africa democratic governance will be further threatened by authoritarian tendencies. But the expansion of Chinese media challenging dominant Western narratives about the continent and has sparked competition between China’s state led media and the Western media organizations for audience. African-focused broadcasting programmes such as the BBC’s Focus on Africa and CNN’s Inside Africa which started in 2012 and 2014 respectively, responded to the creation of CTGN and its two hours of dedicated Africa news bulletins, which began in Reflecting on these dynamics this paper will outline some of the key ways in which China engages and cooperates with African media operators and rather than months – perceived it to lack journalism content and viewed it more as an avenue for channeling China’s soft power.
The hands-off approach of the US towards the African continent under the Trump administration, that has continued under Joe Biden and the continuation of failing European influence has afforded Russia the space to step up. Initially by strengthening regional military forces’ capacity to respond to the threat of Islamist groups across west and central Africa. What Russia stands to gain asides from conflict diamonds and mining rights, its increased influence and the numbers required for key votes in the United Nations General Assembly. The long term effect of this, though, is that democratic gains in West Africa, and indeed the whole of the African continent, could be pegged back as more countries look towards Russia for support.
While China’s spending power on the continent is unmatched, Russian re-entry builds on historic socio-political ties which date back to the Cold War era. During the Cold War the Soviet Union provided arms to revolutionaries in places like Angola and Congo seeking to overthrow colonial governments and their “puppet” successors. The Soviet Union’s interest in exporting its brand of Marxist-Leninism did not just stop at military and ideological support. It expanded that core into a more social enterprise drive model: offering scholarships to a whole generation of African scholars, academics, technocrats and soldiers to be trained in Soviet institutions. The adoption of socialist economics in many an African state was a clear example of this influence. With the collapse of the Soviet Union these African “socialist” states were starved of moral and ideological support as Russia retreated.
However, Russia has recently shown a renewed interest in Africa.2 A meeting co-hosted by the Russian President, Vladimir Putin, and his Egyptian counterpart, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, which was held in Sochi, Russia in October 2019, marked the very first Russia-Africa Summit. At that summit, Putin told a gathering of African leaders that Russia was “not going to participate in a new ‘repartition’ of the continent’s wealth; rather, we are ready to engage in competition for cooperation with Africa”. Renewed Russian interest in Africa has focused on two main areas of support: economic cooperation and military support.
The West is increasingly reluctant to sell arms to West African state actors based on concerns over how the weapons could be used to violate human rights. In 2020, the UK parliament asked Downing Street to investigate human rights abuses by the Nigerian government3 and security agencies against citizens. Securing weapons has been a challenge for state security forces in Nigeria’s northeast and northwest, and in the Liptako-Gourma region4, which borders Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. Multiple reports have documented terrorists, operating as militia in these regions, carting away weapons after successful attacks on military facilities. This raises further concerns that arms could end up in the hands of non-state actors, who are even less accountable for their actions. The government in Moscow is less concerned about human rights given its record against its own people, and its continued support for Soviet-era relics like Aleksandr Lukashenko in Belarus.
As the second-largest weapons producer in the world, Russia is a major supplier of arms to Africa: according to the think-tank Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 13% of Russian arms are sold to African countries. The weaponry sold is predominantly secondhand equipment, such as combat helicopters, aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems. During the two-day summit in Sochi in 2019, the Nigerian government signed a contract6 with Russia for the supply of twelve Mi-35 Hind E attack helicopters, likely to be used in the fight against the jihadist movement, Boko Haram, in the northeast of the country. On 1 October 2021, Mali’s Interim Defence Minister Sadio Camara said that the country had acquired four helicopters, arms and ammunition from Russia in a contract agreed in December 20207 to support its armed forces in their battle with fighters linked to ISIL (ISIS) and al-Qaeda. The inability of the modern state to find lasting solutions to the crisis has seen the country experience three coups, with the latest happening early this year when the transitional government of Bah Ndaw was deposed by Col Assimi Goita who led last year’s coup that ousted deeply unpopular President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita.
Russian private military contractors have also latched on to the security needs of West African states bordering the Sahel where Islamist insecurity is prevalent. In September 2021, a security deal between the mercenary Wagner Group, which is rumoured to have ties to the Kremlin, and the Malian state was agreed according to a report by Reuters. Under the terms of the deal, a thousand personnel are to be deployed to guard regime officials and their families with the Wagner Group paid an estimated 6 billion CFA francs ($10.4 million8) a month for its services. One security source working in the region said the mercenaries would also train the Malian military and provide protection for senior officials. An arrangement that angered French officials given its long-standing military support to the country. But anti-French sentiments in the Sahel have been rising among citizens9 given the inability of French troops stationed in the area to stem violence attributed to the Islamists.
A Weekly Highlight on Political, Security, Socio-Political and Health Happenings Across the West African Region
Burkina Faso and Mali – 18th July to 22nd July 2022
Former ruling party reawakens The National Political Bureau of the People’s Movement for Progress (Mouvement du peuple pour le progress – MPP), held its first ordinary session1 this year on July 16 at the Palais de la Jeunesse et de la Culture in Ouagadougou. During the session, the deteriorating security situation of the country and the increased number of IDPs were some of the focal areas of discussion. While renewing its unwavering support for the Defense and Security Forces (FDS) and the Volunteers for the Defense of the Fatherland (VDP) in the fight against insecurity, MPP invited its supporters to unite and work together for the strengthening and revival of the Party. The party is expected to take all appropriate measures to strengthen unity and cohesion and revitalize the life of the Party’s statutory structures at all organizational levels of the MPP, through field trips. Risks on Security and Socio-political Dynamics CODEL set to continue electoral education
The Convention of Civil Society Organizations for the Observation of Elections (CODEL) launched its project of “citizen watch and monitoring for good electoral governance in Burkina Faso”, on July 21 in Ouagadougou. The project, which stems from the disruption to democratic processes by the coup d’état of January 24, will be implemented over a period of three (03) months for awareness creation among the population on the various recommendations of observation missions in future elections. It will also serve as an opportunity to call on the authorities to clean up the electoral process for better governance in Burkina Faso.
Project activities will be carried out mainly in the central region, particularly in Ouagadougou. The flagship activities include a capitalization meeting on the recommendations resulting from the 2015 and 2020 electoral observations, a forum on electoral corruption and the illicit financing of political parties, advocacy and communications on electoral reforms. Barkhane in Ouagadougou
For the full report of the session and the party’s activities before and during the coup, please see 
At a press briefing organized by the Commander of the Barkhane Force, General Laurent Michon on July 21 in Ouagadougou, to mark the end of his mission in the Sahel, the Commander presented the results and prospects of the French military system in the Sahel region. Commenting on the withdrawal of Takuba and the Barkhane troop in Mali, he distanced the decision from the presence of Wagner but rather linked it to goodwill and hope for the political stability of the region.
MALI Political Dynamics ECOWAS Mediator praises the transition process The ECOWAS Mediator, former Nigerian President Goodluck JONATHAN, was in Bamako from July 20 to 21 to monitor and evaluate the Transition process. During his 48-hour stay, he met with the Malian authorities and members of the local Transition monitoring committee4. It would be recalled that the noteworthy progress made by the transition government enhanced the recent lifting of economic and financial sanctions by ECOWAS and WAEMU. However, ECOWAS had upheld other sanctions such as Mali’s suspension from decision-making institutions, until a peaceful return to constitutional order was attained. Mandated to continue exchanges with Malian authorities, the Mediator noted the resumption of economic activities in post-sanction Mali upon his arrival at the airport. He acknowledged the progress made by the authorities and hoped that it will be maintained for the organization of the elections to allow the democratically elected government to take the reins of the country.
The case of the 49 Ivorian soldiers in Mali Following the arrest of 49 Ivorian soldiers on arrival in Mali, explanations from the Ivorian end linked the arrested soldiers to a UN procedure allowing peacekeeping contingents to call on external contractors for logistical support, the National Support Elements (NSE). However, the Malian authorities regarded the soldiers as mercenaries, and have consequently suspended all rotations of the military and police contingents of the United Nations Mission in Mali (UNMIS), including those already scheduled, the foreign ministry said in a statement. The suspension is effective until the organization of a meeting to facilitate the coordination and regulation of the rotation of these contingents. As a result, 8 soldiers of the German army who had reserved their flights for July 14 were prevented from leaving Malian territory . However, before the expected meeting could even ensue, the Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations in Mali was invited by the Malian Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 20, to be notified that after the discussions between both teams, a series of biased  and unacceptable publications on Twitter by the Spokesperson of MINUSMA, Olivier Salgado, (as stated by the Malian authorities) has led to new developments regarding the case.
In a Communique  by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs dated July 20, Mr. Olivier Salgado was given 72 hours to leave Mali having not been able to present proof of the assertions contained in his tweet, or make the necessary correction demanded by the Malian authorities. Olivier Salgado, a UN diplomat and spokesperson for MINUSMA is the third individual (excluding the Barkhane and Takuba forces) to be declared persona non grata in Mali. Others before him are Hamidou Bolly the ECOWAS representative in Mali, and Jöel Meyer, the French Ambassador to Mali.
Monitoring the reactions of Malians on Twitter to this decision by the government, it appears the decision is welcomed with pride and relief for majority. MINUSMA also acknowledged and regretted the decision, while reiterating to continue to work towards the implementation of its mandate in support of peace and security in Mali
Clarifications on all current military operations demanded Given the inconsistencies surrounding the “49 Ivorian mercenaries” case, the Malian authorities decided to clarify all the military operations in progress in the country, starting with MINUSMA operations. Thus, after the suspension which took effect from July 14, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation requested a coordination meeting between the Malian structures concerned and the MINUSMA to facilitate the coordination and regulation of the rotation of contingents operating within the MINUSMA. And so, on July 12, the Malian government addressed a correspondence to MINUSMA asking for all the necessary documents on its contingents and contractors or co-contractors in Mali; the clarification of the legal or contractual links between the Ivorian soldiers concerned, Sahel Aviation Service and the German contingent of MINUSMA; as well as an update on the numbers of the National Support Elements, together with the precision of their places of deployment and the missions entrusted to them MINUSMA provides clarifications On July 22, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation
Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) transmitted the information requested by the Malian authorities as follows:
1) Clarification on the legal or contractual links between the Ivorian military personnel who arrived in Bamako on 10 July 2022, Sahel Aviation Service and the German contingent of MINUSMA.  MINUSMA notes that the Ivorian elements were deployed to Sénou (Bamako) to provide security at the German NSE base in Sénou, instead of Timbuktu where the Ivorian contingent of MINUSMA is based. It appears that certain procedures were not followed
The communique can be found here https://t.co/SasAXMWbmg and the Mission is trying to better understand how these malfunctions could have occurred in order to avoid their recurrence in the future.
2) Contractual, sub-contractual relationship between the German contingent and third parties MINUSMA is not aware of any contract between Germany and third parties for the protection of the German base in NSE. Measures have already been taken to strengthen the management of NSE
3) Number and location of NSE in MINUSMA UN policies allow TCCs and PCCs to deploy NSEs to provide services to their contingents in a national capacity
Each contingent is responsible for informing MINUSMA on a monthly basis of the number of its national support elements deployed. According to the contingents’ declarations, as of June 2022, the total number of NSEs in Mali is 609, including 471 supporting the German contingent, 33 Bangladeshis, 7 Cambodians, 5 Chadians, 60 British, 4 Sri Lankans, and 29 Swedes.
MINUSMA has not been informed of the presence and number of NSE from Côte d’Ivoire. However, by cross-checking internal documents, MINUSMA estimates the Ivorian detachment to be 50 men and women. MINUSMA has initiated a census of NSE in all its contingents, in order to obtain accurate figures. The Mission will share the findings of its verification once it is complete. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali thanks the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the Republic of Mali for its kind cooperation and takes this opportunity to renew the assurances of its highest consideration.
This new statement is clearly an indication that MINUSMA/United Nations has retraced its steps in the case of the 49 soldiers arrested on Sunday July 10, 2022, in Mali. From the statement, there were indeed malfunctions in the procedure, as contrary to the Ivorian statement on the case, this Note Verbale from MINUSMA clarifies that “the 49 Ivorian soldiers arrested in Bamako are not national elements supporting the Minusma contingents” but, by cross-checking internal documents, MINUSMA estimates that the Ivorian detachment amounts to 50 men and women. Although MINUSMA has informed the Malian authorities “to have initiated a census of the NSE in all its contingents, in order to obtain its verifications once they are established”, could the Malian reasons behind the arrest of the 49 Ivorian soldiers be viable?
A weekly update on political, security, socio-political and health events across the West African region
In the week under review, our focus is on the outcomes of the 61st Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and Government of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held on July 3 2022 at Accra, Ghana, and the impact on ECOWAS Member States.
Key outcomes of the ECOWAS Summit of July 3, 2022 On terrorism in the region, specifically in Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, and Nigeria and the expansion to Benin and Togo, these attacks were strongly condemned while the Authority expressed solidarity with the affected Member States and populations. The Authority reaffirmed its determination to combat relentlessly the scourge of terrorism, to strengthen the operational and logistical capacities of the forces in the frontline countries through the 2022-2024 Action Plan and to promote development programmes and humanitarian support in the affected areas. To that effect, Member States were encouraged to fulfil their pledges on the voluntary contributions into the dedicated fund to support the implementation of the 2020 – 2024 Action Plan.
On Burkina Faso, a progress report was presented by the mediator, former President of Niger, Mahamadou Issoufou. The ECOWAS Authority acknowledged the proposal by the Transition Authorities for the establishment of a joint Monitoring and Evaluation Mechanism with ECOWAS to accompany the Transition process, the release of President Roch Marc Christian KABORE and the new proposed timetable set at 24 months from 1st July 2022. Therefore, the economic and financial sanctions adopted on 25 March were lifted while the suspension of the country from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies was upheld.
On Guinea, the unacceptability of the 36-month transition timetable announced by the Guinean Authorities was reiterated. In response to the Transition’s renouncement of Dr. Mohammed Ibn Chambas as the ECOWAS Mediator to Guinea, the Authority appointed H.E. Yayi BONI, former President of the Republic of Benin as the new ECOWAS Mediator to Guinea. The new mediator is expected to work with the Transition Authorities to arrive at an acceptable transition timetable for the transition latest by 1st August 2022, after which economic and financial sanctions and targeted sanctions will be enforced if no acceptable transition timetable is presented. Furthermore, Guinea remains suspended from all ECOWAS decision-making bodies. On Mali, the economic and financial sanctions previously imposed by the Commission on January 9 were lifted: the closure of the land and air borders between ECOWAS Member States and Mali; the suspension of all commercial and financial transactions between ECOWAS Member States and Mali; the freezing of the assets of the Republic of Mali domiciled in the Central Banks and Commercial Banks of all ECOWAS Member States; the freezing of the assets
of public and parastatal enterprises of the Republic of Mali domiciled in commercial banks of all ECOWAS Member States; the suspension of all financial assistance and transactions in favour of Mali by ECOWAS Financial Institutions, particularly EBID and BOAD. Although the Ambassadors of ECOWAS Member States to Mali were to resume duties, Mali’s suspension from the ECOWAS decision-making bodies and individual sanctions against individuals and groups were maintained pending progress reports on the transition to democracy. A joint monitoring and follow-up mechanism for the implementation of the transition timetable with agreed benchmarks was also established. The Heads of State reiterated the non-candidacy of members of the transition authority in the elections organized for the return to constitutional order.
On the appointment of new statutory appointees of ECOWAS Institutions, taking cognizance of the end of tenure of the statutory appointees on June 30, new appointments were initiated during the summit. The Gambia which was allocated the position of President of the ECOWAS Commission, with Dr. Omar Alieu Touray appointed as the President of the ECOWAS Commission for a four-year term with effect from 11th July 2022. Togo’s Ms. Damtien Tchintchibidja emerged as the Vice-President. The President of Guinea Bissau, Umaro Sissoco Embalo was elected the Chairman of the ECOWAS Authority of Heads of State and Government for a one-year term.
The outcomes of the Summit were welcomed by the United States through a press statement
2. Particularly the agreement between ECOWAS and Mali on a 24-month transition timeline starting in March 2022, the Burkina Faso transition government’s proposal to ECOWAS for a two-year transition timeline to return Burkina Faso to democratically elected, civilian-led governance, and the release of President Roch Marc Christian Kabore. They urged the transition government in Guinea to move the country quickly toward a constitutional, civilian-led democracy through a transparent and consultative process. They commended the leadership of Ghanaian President Nana Akufo-Addo over the past year and welcomed the election of Bissau- Guinean President Umaro Embalo, while expressing the United States’ commitment to supporting ECOWAS and the transition governments of Mali, Guinea, and Burkina Faso as they navigate their paths toward responsive democratic governance. In reaction to the lifting of sanctions, Malians have expressed joy over ECOWAS decision in the hope that their country’s economy would improve
3 .BURKINA FASO
Political Dynamics Former President Roch Marc Kabore is released
As part of the dynamics of strengthening social cohesion and national reconciliation in the country, the Government has reaffirmed the total release of the former Head of State, Roch Kabore. This was announced in a Communique by the governing authorities
4 . His freedom was also confirmed by the former Alliance of the parties of the presidential majority (Ex-APMP)
5 .Activists and supporters of the former presidential majority (APMP) paid a courtesy visit to him on July 6 at his home in Ouagadougou. They used the opportunity to reaffirm their loyalty to the former president deposed by the military on January 24, and to assure the general public of the soundness of his mind and shape
6 .72nd Ordinary session of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP) The members of the National Political Bureau of the Congress for Democracy and Progress (CDP Futurist Wing) held the 72nd ordinary session of their party on July 2 in Ouagadougou
7 .During the meeting, discussions revolved around the party’s internal crisis and the party’s receipt. The party president, Eddie Komboigo asks the transitional authorities to respect the administrative rules and enhance the issuance of the document. The party also congratulated members how refused to leave the party, especially those claiming to belong to the historical wing of the party. He reminded the party members of their objective which is the conquest of power to soothe the pain of the people of Burkina Faso. He also called for unity among party members.
The ECOWAS Mediator to Burkina Faso meets President Damiba The ECOWAS Mediator for Burkina Faso, Mahamadou ISSOUFOU met the Transition President on July 2, ahead of the ECOWAS Summit on July 3. He also met the Prime Minister and certain members of the government, representatives of political parties, religious authorities, the National Youth Council, and a delegation from the Francophonie. The report of his visit was presented at the ECOWAS summit
8 .Burkina Faso strengthens its relationship with the Republic of Chile Personalities from the Republic of Chile including Alex Wetzig, Secretary General for Foreign Policy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Chile and Ambassador of Chile in Addis Ababa met Excellency Sylvain Yaméogo, Ambassador, Deputy Permanent Representative, on July 4
9 . The exchange meeting, part of a bilateral framework of mutual support, served as an avenue for
Burkina Faso to learn of opportunities for collaboration in the sectors of agriculture, livestock, education and mining. The meeting ended with good political will to seal a development partnership for the benefit of the two States.
Burkina Faso’s reaction to the ECOWAS Summit’s decisions In response to the withdrawal of the economic and financial sanctions which had been adopted at the Extraordinary Summit of March 25, 2022, the government of Burkina Faso acknowledged that the opportunity of consolidating its cooperation with its bilateral and multilateral partners
10 . The Government appreciated the patience and attentive listening of their mediator, Mahamadou ISSOUFOU, and his enhancement of a compromise between ECOWAS and the transition governing authorities. Nevertheless, the government deplored the upheld suspension of Burkina Faso from ECOWAS decision-making bodies, while reaffirming its will and determination to promote a peaceful and timely transition to democratic rule.
While visiting the President of Faso, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo DAMIBA, at the end of his mission on July 5, the Danish Ambassador to Burkina Faso, Steen Sonne ANDERSEN, also appreciated the agreement between Burkina Faso and ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) for the return to constitutional order. Additionally, in view of strengthening the cooperation between Denmark and Burkina Faso, the diplomat reiterated Denmark’s commitment to supporting Burkina Faso in tackling humanitarian challenges
11 . In line with this, the two countries recently signed an agreement on a major five- year cooperation program of 100 billion FCFA, that will focus on activities to help populations in their development.
High-level meeting of the presidents of Burkina Faso
Transition President of Faso, Lieutenant-Colonel Paul-Henri Sandaogo DAMIBA met the former Heads of State of Burkina Faso on July 8 in Ouagadougou. Invited presidents included Roch Marc Christian KABORÉ, Michel KAFANDO, Yacouba Isaac ZIDA, Blaise COMPAORÉ and Jean-Baptiste OUÉDRAOGO.
The reconciliation initiative and the return of former leader Blaise Compaoré was initiated by former president Roch Kaboré but halted by the trial of the assassination of Thomas Sankara. However, arrangements made by the current transition president have facilitated Compaoré’s arrival in Ouagadougou and participation in the reconciliation.
Although the meeting was to enhance a lasting peace and reconciliation, Michel Kafando was absent for health reasons, Yacouba Isaac Zida for administrative reasons, and Roch Kaboré prevented by an angry crowd, also could not attend this meeting.
CLAIM: The national grid has collapsed 18 times in 2022
CONTEXT: An online news site published a news report on its website saying the “National Grid has collapsed for the 18th time in 2022.”
VERIFICATION: In verifying the claim, Daily Trust chronicled the number of times the national grid collapsed in 2022 and found out that it was five times this year, and not 18 times. The latest system collapse being the fifth this year, occurred around 12 noon when the grid went blank. Before now the country experienced similarly collapse on 14 March, 9 April, 10 May and 12 June respectfully.
WHY WE FACT CHECKED THIS: This claim was fact checked to provide the facts to citizens to avoid inflammatory statements leading to potentially volatile responses.
CLAIM: Tom Hanks, a Hollywood actor, has endorsed the Labour Party presidential candidate, Peter Obi
CONTEXT: A post that has been in circulation on social media claims that Tom Hanks, a Hollywood actor, has endorsed the Labour Party presidential candidate, Peter Obi, via a tweet.
VERIFICATION: Checks by our partners at Daily Trust revealed that the post in circulation is false. Interestingly, the last time Hanks tweeted with his verified handle was two years ago, on 22 May, 2020.
Also, the claim that Americans had a standing ovation is false and misleading as there was no account of such in the media.
We can confirm after verification that the post in circulation suggesting Tom Hanks made a tweet endorsing Peter Obi is false.
WHY WE FACT CHECKED THIS: Political campaigns are the source of misleading information, designed to promote or denigrate candidacies. The Centre has fact-checked this to avoid misinformation playing a part in the electoral process.
CLAIM: APC National Secretary, Iyiola Omisore, was spotted distributing cash to voters during Osun Election.
CONTEXT: A video has surfaced online showing the National Secretary of the All Progressives Congress, Iyiola Omisore, distributing cash and clothing materials to a crowd at an open space decorated for an event. In the video, the politician can be seen wearing a green traditional attire with a cap to match sharing N2,000 to individuals, mostly women. The post was made on 14th July, 2022, and had been retweeted several times.
VERIFICATION: To investigate the claim, our partners at Daily Trust carried out a key frame analysis of the video using InVid, an online video verification tool, which revealed that the video had been on the internet since 2014.
The video was first posted by YNaija in a report titled, “#OsunDecides: Thousands gather in Osogbo as Omisore shares cash.” Part of the report reads, “There were thousands of people at the field beside the OYESTECH training centre in Osogbo this afternoon. They were there to receive a sum of money per person from the Omisore Youth Support Foundation (OYSF).”
The result of the investigation revealed that the video alleging that Omisore was buying votes in today’s governorship election in Osun State is an old video aimed to disinform as such should be disregarded as it is false.
WHY WE FACT CHECKED THIS: CDD fact checked this to avoid swaying voters and to avoid complications when result of the election is published.
CLAIM: Davido is giving out free 5k airtime and 10GB data in celebration of his uncle’s success in the Osun Governorship election.
VERDICT: FALSE AND MISLEADING
CONTEXT: Since July 18, 2022, aftermath the declaration of Ademola Adeleke, candidate of the Peoples’ Democratic Party (PDP) winner of Osun governorship election by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC). Social media platforms, particularly WhatsApp, Facebook and Twitter have been dominated by a broadcast message, with claim; “Osun Decides 2022 Davido Is Giving Out Free 5k Airtime Voucher And 10GB Data As Way Of Celebrating And Saying Thank you For Voting His Uncle Adeleke As The Winner Of the 2022 Election, Hurry Now And Get Yours”. On the message, links for different network options were providers.
VERIFICATION: CDD fact-checkers looked to verify the claim’s authenticity by assessing the links in the broadcast message to be used by those interested members of the public, expectedly resident of the Osun State. A click on any of the links’ redirects to what looks like a fake Blogspot with comments and appraisals from those who have allegedly gotten the free airtime. However, once a number is inputted, the site begins to process and afterward stops responding.
Further checks and critical analysis of the website through fact-checking tools revealed it to be a phishing website created by scammers to mislead the public into providing personal information. The website was also flagged as unsafe and containing misleading content by the web browser in use.
CONCLUSION: CDD-Fact Checkers can confirm that the claim is false. David Adeleke, AKA Davido, the music icon, whose uncle, Senator Ademola Adeleke was recently elected Governor of Osun state is not giving out Free N5,000 airtime voucher and 10GB of Data as a way of celebrating and saying thank you for voting his uncle, Ademola Adeleke. We can confirm that the message trending on social media is clickbait.
WHY WE FACT CHECKED THIS: We fact-checked this as the intention of phishing websites like this is to make people believe it is legitimate. Today, phishing schemes have gotten more varied, and are potentially more dangerous than before.
CLAIM: Adeleke’s son, Adebayo ‘B-Red’ Adeleke, was recorded sharing money to people on the street.
CONTEXT: A 15-second video showing the son of Senator Ademola Adeleke, the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) governorship candidate in Osun State, sharing money for people on the street has been posted on Twitter.
The video was captioned “Ademola Adeleke’s son Bred sharing money to voters.”
In the video, Bred was seen giving out N500 notes randomly to people who seem excited to see him.
There were two security men between him and the crowd who were trying to prevent them from getting closer to his car.
The tweet by one Qudus Akanbi Eleyi had amassed over 2,000 views, over 100 likes, and retweets, and more than 40 comments as of the time of filing this report.
Our partners at Daily Trust ascertained that the claim was made by a Twitter user, Qudus Akanbi Eleyi, and the tweet had amassed over 2,000 views, over 100 likes, and retweets, and more than 40 comments as of the time of filing this report. During investigation, we found out that the video was recorded in Lagos State days before the Osun gubernatorial election that took place on 16 July. The singer was only sharing money with fans who were happy to see him upon his arrival in Lagos State. Several comments under tweet confirmed our findings. One of such comments read “why this hate? This is when this guy landed in Lagos airport, why are you all posting this video?”. Another read “This was the day he landed from abroad two days ago. He met people on the road, and they begged him for money which he gave them. This is not today.”
We can confirm that the video in circulation suggesting that Adebayo ‘B-Red’ Adeleke was sharing money to voters on behalf of his father is false.
WHY WE FACT CHECKED THIS: The election information space is saturated with several claims that are targeted at the candidates that could either incite violence or sway votes. This fake news had the potential of the later and as such was debunked by CDD.
Even before the current spate of rural violence and banditry in northwest Nigeria, Kaduna state has been a hotspot of violent conflict with a history of religious and ethnic conflicts, political violence as well as deep-rooted indigene-settler disharmony. Present-day rural banditry, in the form of kidnapping, pillage of rural communities and mass killings, has fluidly diffused into pre-existing ethno-religious tensions and bigotry, which is often amplified by the media and political commentators. Every killing, kidnapping or act of violence in Kaduna is seen as Muslim against the Christian or vice-versa, thereby inflaming the multiple complexities of the conflict. As a result, armed banditry in the state has the potential of being misinterpreted in different ways, compared to other states with less of a history of ethnic and religious violence.
Traditional leaders—Hakimai and Ardo—are ever-present conflict actors either as its victims or as agents of peacebuilding and resolution. Socially speaking, traditional authorities are the agents of peace and social cohesion. They operate at the grassroots and interact regularly and closely with the masses. In addition, they are custodians of culture and traditions. They are also the major pillars for the success of any social programme and public policy design and implementation. When it comes to conflict resolution, they have a vast knowledge and experience of the acceptable traditional methods and procedures of conflict management, conflict resolution and peacebuilding. In fact it has been argued that the collapse of the traditional conflict resolution and peacebuilding architectures in many societies was partly responsible for the escalation of this violent conflict in Kaduna state.
In recognition of this Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD), Abuja in partnership with the Centre for Peace Studies, Usmanu Danfodiyo University, Sokoto organised a two-day capacity building training for selected Hakimai and Ardo in Kaduna state on peacebuilding and conflict resolution under its Strengthening the Delivery of Peace and Security (SDPS) Project.
The key essence of the training was to provide a platform in, which the capacity of traditional leaders would be improved by strengthening their traditional methods of conflict resolution in order to serve as agents of peace and conflict resolution. This approach is based on the premise that traditional leaders are best placed to counter negative narratives by the media and individuals that could instigate and inflame violent conflict. Without challenging and correcting ethnic and religious profiling the evolving conflicts in volatile Kaduna state will likely continue to linger and spread. The situation requires more urgent and effective proactive measures and CDD believes the best point to start is from the Hakimai and Ardo, who are the custodian of peace and conflict resolution. The main objective is therefore, to build the capacity of traditional leaders to strengthen their knowledge and expertise to understanding the challenging dynamics, trends, dimensions and complexities of all types of conflicts in Kaduna state and to support their efforts to contribute meaningfully towards peacebuilding and resolution using all necessary traditional and religious mechanisms as differentiated in various communities and religious domains.
Despite apprehension about the possibility of violent disruption of the election, the process has turned out to be peaceful. Like the Ekiti State governorship election before it, the Osun poll witnessed impressive voter enthusiasm. At the conclusion of voting, collation and declaration of results, the CDD-EAC issues this post-election statement on its overall findings on the conduct and outcome of the keenly contested election. This post-election statement provides updates on an earlier Interim Statement on key processes and procedures in the election. CDD-EAC observes that the post-election environment has remained calm, peaceful and free of any agitations following the declaration of the results by the State Collation Officer appointed by INEC. According to the results as declared by the INEC State Collation Officer, Senator Ademola Adeleke of the PDP polled 403,371 votes (51.8%) to defeat his closest challenger, Governor Gboyega Oyetola of the APC, who polled 375,027 votes (48.2%)
Democracy, in its most general conception as a system that guarantees popular participation, transparency and accountability, represents an ideal towards which most political systems aspire. The circumstances of developing countries of the global south where basic issues of human and social existence – viable statehood, national cohesion, security, poverty, disease, employment, literacy, and so on – are problematic however make democracy a difficult road to travel. Indeed, for a long time when the ‘prerequisites of democracy’ perspective, whose adherents argued that only societies that had reasonably high levels of socioeconomic development were the most viable candidates for democracy held sway, the prospects for(liberal) democracy in developing countries were considered low. The preponderance of authoritarian regimes all over Africa, Asia and Latin America, the seeming imperviousness to democratic change that followed repeated failures of demilitarization, re-civilianization and other popular modes of democratization in the 1970s and early 1980s, and the avowed suitability and successes of ‘developmental dictatorship’ (also called modernizing or developmental oligarchy) as a Third World model, provided some empirical validation for this view. All that was before the ‘global democratic revolution’ of the late 1980s and 1990s swept through the bastions of authoritarianism in Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa, and produced in its wake, the diffusion of democracy all over the world. The ‘revolution’ offered the opportunity for scholars to revisit conventional wisdom on democracy and democratization. From an African and Nigerian point of view, perhaps the most important strand of the reexamination, and one which challenged the sequential assumptions of the prerequisites of democracy perspective, had to do with the democracy-development nexus.
For Richard Sklar (1987), one of the leading lights of the new thinking, democracy as a political means, is a facilitator of development, and socioeconomic development is not a necessary condition for democracy. To think of democracy this way is to give content and meaning to the aspiration and struggles for it in the global South. In other words, the drive towards democracy is not simply to fulfil an ideological aspiration (such as democracy for its own sake), but to build a meaningful capacity for development, one that enables the free rein of participatory rights, creative energies and entrepreneurship, and above all, accountability. Another important strand, which complemented the emergent utilitarian conception of democracy nicely, was the argument that democracy entailed a lot more than elections. The point of the argument is not to deny the centrality of the franchise and free and fair elections, and the fact that elections provide a barometer for gauging the quality and growth of democracy, but to avoid the ‘fallacy of electoralism’ or the tendency to focus on elections as the most important aspects of democracy and equate successful elections especially those in which incumbents lose with democratic growth, at the expense of the larger contextual and utilitarian dimensions of democracy (Karl, 2000).
These ‘new’ ways of thinking encouraged a conception of democracy that emphasizes its problem-solving and utilitarian value and benefits, what are now more popularly referred to as the ‘dividends of democracy’. The persistence of state fragility that reduced capacities to deliver on basic functions and obligations and sent some countries into desperate intensive care mode further reinforced the emancipatory and empowering expectations of democracy. The dividends, measured in terms of the value added to the material wellbeing and security of citizens, social cohesion and national integration, institution-building, conflict management, anti-corruption drives, and the like, have gained traction in assessments of fledgling and emerging democracies for the simple reason that, as is becoming increasingly clear, it is when democracy can demonstrably make a positive difference in the conditions of the state, government and wellbeing of citizens that it stands a good chance of being sustained, defended, and consolidated (cf. Przeworksi et al, 1996 for ‘what makes democracies endure?’). The social, economic, electoral, and legal-constitutional reforms that have become instruments and concomitants of democratic governance are to be seen in the light of giving material content to democracy a la dividends. These are the kinds of complexities, challenges and expectations that make democracy such an engaging subject for Nigerian and African scholars. They provide a useful backdrop for reading this edited volume and locating the analyses in its 28 chapters. The book ties democracy to nation-building and development, and the various contributors assess the journey so far in the first twenty years of the latest phase of Nigeria’s democratic experience. The fact that this experience has been the longest and most enduring offers the opportunity to ask the empirical question posed by Przeworski et al: ‘why has democracy endured? in the Nigerian context. If, as the contributors believe, the twenty years have witnessed debilitating pathologies ranging from economic mismanagement, vote buying, corruption and weak institutions to exclusion of women and youth, electoral violence, anomalous party politics and judicial infractions, the question of why democracy has endured becomes even more apposite. Perhaps there is something in Nigeria’s democracy that has worked in spite of the numerous problems. We may not find all the answers in this book, but the editors do well to not only acknowledge the challenges, but to offer problem-solving pathways to the future by exploring areas where the country still needs to improve as it moves into a third decade.
CLAIM: 40% of Osun voters are between the ages of 18 -34.
CONTEXT: On the 16th of July 2022, fact-checkers at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) spotted a claim which stated that almost 40% of registered voters in the Osun 2022 Gubernatorial Election are between 18-34.
VERIFICATION: Fact-checkers of CDD investigated the claim and our findings according to data provided by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) a non-profit organisation in Osun state records that the gender disaggregation of registered voters shows that 52.76% of registered voters is female while 47.24%. The data shows that the youth (18- 34 years) which has the highest representation of voters is 39.7%, while the middle-aged represent 32.5%, the elderly 19.2% and the old 8.51%.
CONCLUSION: CDD fact-checkers can confirm that the claim about 40% of Osun Voters being between 18 -34 years is True
CDD is urging members of the public to verify from certified source before sharing any news report especially, from a random WhatsApp status
CLAIM: The INEC result viewing portal (IREV) is down.
CONTEXT: On the 16th of July 2022, fact-checkers spotted a claim on the night of election day at 10:35 pm saying “INEC Result viewing portal (IREV) is down and citizens can no longer see results being posted from the polling units.
VERIFICATION: CDD Fact checkers began investigations into this claim, and findings from our election Analysis Centre reported that the INEC result viewing portal (Irev) had been tracked since 2:30 pm when voting closed at polling units.
Analysing the Irev data, CDD fact-checkers confirmed that as of 10:35 pm, 3,3739 out of 3,763 results had been uploaded at the polling units. The portal was also reported to be fully active all through the period of tracking, without a shutdown
CONCLUSION: CDD fact-checkers can confirm that the claim that INEC Result Viewing Portal (Irev) is down is False. The portal was still open as of 10:35 pm.
CDD is urging members of the public to verify from certified source before sharing any news report especially, from a random WhatsApp status
CLAIM: People are not allowed to vote for PDP at Okerewe 3, PU 14, in Ife Local Government Area.
VERIFICATION: The CDD fact-checkers in their investigation tried to verify the authenticity of the tweet by scanning the profile of the artist and that of @SodiqTade. The scan showed that the original tweet by @SodiqTade was already deleted signalling the lack of authenticity of the claim.
CONCLUSION: During CDD investigations, the fact-checkers ascertained that people were not stopped from voting for PDP at the centre indicated.
CLAIM: Out of 13 local government results now, APC won 3, and PDP won 10.
VERDICT: False and Misleading.
CONTEXT: CDD fact checkers spotted a trending WhatsApp story screenshot with the claim that out of 13 local government results released as of 7:07 pm, the APC won 3, while the PDP won 10.
VERIFICATION: CDD fact-checkers looked to verify the claim through monitoring of the INEC result viewing portal by the Fact Check Hub of the CDD Election Analysis Centre. Our analysis showed that only 2 local government results (Obokun and Boluwaduro) were out as of 7:30 pm on July 16th. 13 local government results were not released at the time in the post, this, therefore, makes it misleading to allocate winnings to any political party. To further authenticate the claim, the fact check team reached out to Professor Muhammed Kuna, the Technical Adviser to the INEC chairman who summarized that there are laid down procedures for the announcement of results, as polling unit results and ward results go to the local government level before they can be declared, in line with the INEC guideline for the announcement of results. At the time of placing the call at 9:50 pm, He mentioned that the LGA results cannot yet be concluded, as 70 polling unit results were not yet out and all stipulated procedures had not been finalized, further confirming the post to be misleading.
CONCLUSION: CDD fact-checkers can confirm that the claim is misleading. Monitoring of the INEC result viewing portal by the CDD Election Analysis Centre shows that only 2 local government results (Obokun and Boluwaduro) were out as of 7:30 pm on July 16th. 13 local government results were not released at the time in the post, this, therefore, makes it misleading to allocate winnings to any political party.
With voting in the 16 July 2022 Osun State Governorship election already underway across the 30 Local Government Areas of the state, the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) through its Election Analysis Centre (EAC) has been closely observing the election. CDD-EAC deployed 300 trained and accredited observers who are currently collecting data on key aspects of the day’s voting and voting related process. The objective of the CDD-EAC doing this is to determine through evidence based analysis, the credibility of the election in meeting and satisfying canons of electoral integrity under Nigerian laws and international codes and standards.
The observations that follow are based on preliminary findings of the conducts and procedures on the election day.
General Environment of the Election The CDD-EAC notes the signing of the peace accord by thirteen out of the fifteen political parties taking part in the election and other measures aimed at ensuring the election is hitch free. The decision by the political actors to commit to an agreement, which enjoins them to do their part in ensuring a violence-free election is laudable. Although pockets of disagreements between party agents and INEC officials were reported by our observers in a few polling units, these were largely resolved. CDD-EAC similarly notes that in the build up to today’s governorship election, a number of consultations and strategy sessions involving the Election Management Body and the relevant security agencies were held under the Inter-Agency Consultative Committee on Election Security (ICCES). These consultations were observed to have happened at both national and state level; added to this is the deployment of 21,000 police officers to the state. We hope these measures contribute to the peaceful conduct of the election.
INEC Preparedness and Deployment Data from the CDD-EAC observers indicate that 97 percent of INEC officials had arrived at their polling units by 8:30am. It further shows that 79 percent of INEC poll officials addressed voters before the 8:30am official time of poll opening. CDD-EAC data indicates that in at least 92 percent of polling units observed critical election materials like ballot papers, Biometric Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) devices, results sheets, ballot boxes and the voter register were available for the conduct of the election – a marked improvement over the 83 percent recorded in Ekiti. CDD-EAC notes that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) took some steps to address some of the gaps identified in the Ekiti State governorship election last month. INEC has embedded officials of the National Union of Road Transport Workers (NURTW) in the INEC situation room in Osogbo to help address issues around deployment of personnel and movement of voting materials. The Commission similarly conducted mock accreditation exercises in Osogbo, Borife, Ede, and Egbedore to test the preparedness of the trained staff and the efficiency of the BVAS.
Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) The mock accreditation exercise carried out by INEC to ensure the readiness of the 5,306 BVAS machines appears to have worked, with CDD-EAC officials noting that there was a BVAS machine and compliance in 99% of the polling units visited, with two polling units in Ife Central and Irepodun reporting the absence of BVAS machines at 9:30am.
Electoral Offences CDD-EAC observers reported cases of political party agents campaigning, and canvassing for votes near the polling unit in 14 LGAs, which represents 9.6 percent of the polling units observed. These acts which contravene the provisions of the Electoral Act 2022 were mostly reported by observers in Ife Central, Odo Otin, Osogbo, Oriade and Irepodun. CDD-EAC observers also reported seeing unremoved campaign posters at some polling units, just as political party agents openly canvassed for votes.
Fake News CDD-EAC Fake News Hub for the July 16, Osun State Governorship election has been closely watching online and offline spaces with the objective of tracking and fact-checking fake news and misinformation. A number of fake news stories, misleading captions for images, and the sharing of dead online links are being used by partisan actors to mislead voters or to possibly depress the vote in areas in which the political opposition is perceived to have some strengths. CDD-EAC fact-checkers have also documented claims and counter-claims by political actors over allegations of vote buying. Using online tools, and a range of verification techniques, CDD-EAC fact-checkers have been working to independently fact-check online and offline misinformation capable of undermining voter confidence. One of the major fake news stories, which began trending as voters headed to the polls this morning, is the claim that the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) candidate, Ademola Adeleke had been sacked by a court. CDD-EAC fact checkers verified and found this claim to be false. CDD-EAC fact-checkers also spotted a claim that one of the major opposition parties’ candidates was asking voters to swear an oath that voters voted for him before he would pay them. CDD-EAC fact-checkers found nothing on the circulated image to lend credence to the claim. Our fact-checkers also noted that the image, which was circulated to make the claim, was taken at the point the candidate was casting his vote.
Conclusion CDD-EAC observers will continue to keep a close watch on the election up till when voting ends, and counting and collation of results begin. Further updates on findings will be provided at the end of voting.
CLAIM: APC members and some PDP traitors connived with INEC to thumbprint 100,000 ballot papers.
CONTEXT: On the 16th of July, 2022, Fact checkers at the Centre for Democracy and Development (CDD) spotted a voice note claim which alleges that “some APC and PDP betrayals are presently in Government house with the support of INEC to thumbprint 100,000 ballot papers. He alleged that they are also using the BVAS to authenticate their illegality. According to him, he was 100 per cent sure and wants PDP leaders to take action NOW!!!”
VERIFICATION: CDD Fact checkers interrogated the claim based on the Independent National Electoral (INEC) Electoral guidelines. CDD findings revealed that as part of its electoral guidelines INEC has coded every ballot paper based on the total number of registered voters at every polling unit.
Further checks on the claim also alleged that BVAS is being authenticated their illegality, CDD findings revealed that the BVAS device is coded from the ICT department of INEC National Headquarters, also the BVAS device is also activated on the morning of the election day. Lastly, the process of sensitive materials being deployed to polling units on election day in the company of security personnel contradicts the above claim.
CDD can confirm after investigation and fact analysis that the claim that APC and some PDP traitors are working with INEC to thumbprint 100,000 ballot papers is False.
The CDD urges members of the public to read beyond headlines before sharing any news report, especially on social media.
You can forward suspicious messages for verification via +2349062910568 or contact us on Twitter @CDDWestAfrica